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Abstract
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks can easily cripple victim hosts or networks,
yet effective defenses remain elusive. Normal anycast can be used to force the diffusion
of attack traffic over a group of several hosts to increase the difficulty of saturating
resources at or near any one of the hosts. However, because a packet sent to the anycast
group may be delivered to any member, anycast does not support protocols that require
a group member to maintain state (such as TCP). This makes anycast impractical for
most applications of interest.
This document describes the design of Stateful Anycast, a conceptual anycast-like
network service based on IP anycast. Stateful Anycast is designed to support state-
ful sessions without losing anycast’s ability to defend against DDoS attacks. Stateful
Anycast employs a set of anycasted proxies to direct packets to the proper stateholder.
These proxies provide DDoS protection by dropping a session’s packets upon group
member request. Stateful Anycast is incrementally deployable and can scale to support
many groups.
Thesis Supervisor: Karen R. Sollins
Title: Principal Research Scientist
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Internet distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks have been receiving much attention
due to the disruption they cause and the lack of an easy defense. DDoS attacks over-
whelm their targets by saturating the data links leading to the target or by completely
consuming some other computational resource. With the target overwhelmed, legiti-
mate users can no longer access any of the target’s services. The attacks are launched
from a botnet, a collection of remotely-controlled computers (referred to as zombies)
distributed throughout the Internet. These zombies have typically been compromised
with automated scripts designed to quickly grow the size of the attacker’s botnet to
thousands or possibly millions of machines. Each machine may not be capable of sourc-
ing a significant amount of traffic, but when the capabilities of many zombie machines
are combined, a formidable weapon is created.
A DDoS attack can take down a host or network for weeks, wreaking serious eco-
nomic damage to an on-line business. One DDoS extortion case in 2003 was documented
in a May 2005 article in CSO Magazine [17]. DDoS attacks also have the potential to
take out key infrastructure, as witnessed by a couple of major attemps to take down
the Internet’s root DNS servers [24,32,42,73]. DDoS attacks even disrupted Akamai—
a content distribution network often used by companies to protect themselves against
DDoS attacks—in 2004 [72].
Despite years of research, an effective, practical, and general solution to the DDoS
problem has remained elusive. Many of the proposed solutions are specific to a certain
type of attack or protocol, or they require extensive modifications to the network archi-
tecture or infrastructure. Stateful Anycast is an attempt at providing a partial solution
to the DDoS problem that is effective, practical, and general. Stateful Anycast is not a
complete solution to the DDoS threat, as it does not handle the problem of detecting
attacks; its primary purpose is to squelch an attack once it has been discovered.
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1.1 Two Types of DDoS Attacks
Before diving into how and why DDoS attacks happen, it is important to recognize that
DDoS attacks come in many flavors. Mirkovic and Reiher describe a comprehensive
taxonomy of DDoS attacks in [45], but this document will use a simpler classification
and divide DDoS attacks into two simple types:
1. End-node attacks: These attacks consume some resource in the targeted end node.
When a resource is consumed, the end node is unable to service the legitimate
traffic it receives. These attacks can consume storage used to hold state (e.g., TCP
SYN floods [21]), processing cycles (e.g., repeated cryptographic key exchange),
battery power, and so on.
2. Network resource attacks: These attacks consume some resource in the network
leading to the end-node. When a network resource is consumed, the network is
unable to deliver some fraction of the legitimate traffic to the end node. The
canonical example is flooding the link that leads to a strategic end node with
random1 traffic. The end node may be perfectly capable of processing all of
the offered load, but, because the network is the bottleneck, the end node never
receives the good traffic to process.
Categorizing DDoS attacks in this way is useful because of how each type of
attack is mitigated. Attacks on the end node involve local defenses, such as an increase
in processing power or storage. While implementing local defenses is not always easy,
it is generally possible and—more importantly—in the victim’s control.
Attacks on the network, on the other hand, pose a greater challenge. A DDoS
attack on the network can only be mitigated upstream of the consumed resource, often
moving the only feasible points of defense out of the direct control of the victim. Even
when upstream network operators are willing to implement defenses on behalf of the
victim, technical challenges remain. The end node has all the insight into whether a
packet might be legitimate or malicious, yet it is the network that must decide whether
to drop or forward the packet. Imbuing the network with the ability to identify at-
tack traffic without any of the contextual knowledge held by the end node remains a
challenging problem, although there has been some work in this area [30,63].
Stateful Anycast is designed to address the greater challenge of network resource
attacks. Because of this focus, and to simplify discourse, the phrase “DDoS attacks”
will be used throughout the remainder of this document to refer to DDoS attacks on
the network rather than its more general meaning.
1An attacker could add more teeth to the attack by choosing to flood with traffic that also consumes
an end-node resource, but this is not necessary if the attacker is successful in saturating links and
preventing legitimate traffic from reaching the end node in the first place.
12
1.2. Assumed Attacker Abilities
1.2 Assumed Attacker Abilities
Throughout this document, attackers are assumed to be able to amass a well-distributed
botnet capable of disabling a limited number of selected targets by saturating the net-
work links leading to each target. Each zombie can source arbitrary packets, including
packets with spoofed source addresses. The attacker’s botnet is not large enough to
disable all members of an anycast group.
1.3 How DDoS Attacks are Possible
Currently, there is no easy way to stop DDoS attacks from happening—the design of
the Internet makes it so. There is no general way for a receiver to tell the network not
to deliver a particular packet to it. The Internet was designed to be transparent to the
end hosts: in theory, packets going in come back out at their destination, unchecked
and unmodified. This end-to-end architecture, defended by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark
[67], has some important benefits. First, the network can be constructed using simple,
inexpensive devices. Second, the network’s obliviousness to the meaning or intent of a
packet allows it to support novel, unforeseen applications. Unfortunately, obliviousness
also means that the network cannot be asked to decide which packets should and should
not be delivered, so everything arrives at the recipient.
The fundamental challenge in mitigating DDoS attacks stems from the need of
every participant in a stateful session to direct packets toward the session’s stateholder
(or holders). Participants must be given a handle on the stateholder—an IP address of
a web server, for example—that is then given to the network. The network uses these
handles to locate and route packets to the stateholder.
The ability to send to a specific stateholder can be abused if the network is not
designed appropriately. Specifically, DDoS attacks are possible when stateholder handles
are both portable and permanent. Unfortunately, both of these conditions are true in
the current design of the Internet’s basic protocols. Elimination of either the portability
or the permanence of handles will limit the success of DDoS attacks.
1.3.1 Portable Stateholder Handles
Portable stateholder handles are handles that can be used from anywhere in the network
to reach a specific stateholder. Non-portable handles are valid only at certain locations
or regions in the network, limiting their usability to one or a small fraction of the
hosts. In the Internet, handle portability can be safely assumed: IP addresses globally
identify a single host, except for the anycast, multicast, and broadcast addresses that
are rarely—if ever—used in a stateful conversation.
With portable stateholder handles, an attacker can amplify an attack by instruct-
ing an arbitrary number of distributed, colluding hosts to send packets to the victim.
By limiting the usability of a handle to one or a few hosts, a malicious, distributed load
can be diffused among a group of identical stateholders in a manner similar to anycast.
13
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Each sender would be given a handle to a different stateholder upon session initiation,
and because each handle is unusable by others, the malicious senders would be unable
to focus their resources on disrupting a specific stateholder.
Traffic Validation Architecture, the capabilities-based DDoS mitigation approach
proposed by Yang, et al. [75], is one proposed mechanism for making stateholder handles
non-portable. IP anycast, discussed in section 2.2, also makes handles non-portable by
restricting communication with a particular group member to the region around the
group member.
There are a couple of negative side-effects to making stateholder handles non-
portable, however. First, support for sender mobility is lost. If a legitimate host moves
to a different region of the network, the handle may no longer be usable and commu-
nication can be disrupted. Second, if handle usability is tied to topology, changes in
topology due to events such as failed links can invalidate handles. To continue a session
disrupted by an invalidated handle, the sender must be able to detect that the handle is
unusable and acquire a new handle. This may be a challenging task depending on the
design of the mechanisms that cause the non-portability. To avoid this issue, Stateful
Anycast chooses to mitigate DDoS attacks by making handles non-permanent.
1.3.2 Permanent Stateholder Handles
Permanent stateholder handles are handles that, once acquired, can be used for all time
to reach a specific stateholder. The unicast IP address is the most immediate example
of a permanent handle. Once an attacker knows a stateholder’s IP address, the only
way to remove the attacker’s ability to send packets to the stateholder is to relocate to
a different part of the network and get a different IP address.
If handles are made temporary or cancelable, stateholders can get reprieve from
sessions that have turned malicious. Any attempts at obtaining new handles to replace
revoked ones can be diffused over a group of identical stateholders in order to prevent
the load from overcoming any one stateholder. This is the approach Stateful Anycast
takes.
Session invalidation must be enforced by the network far away from the state-
holder. If enforcement happens near the stateholder, an attacker may still be able to
inflict significant damage. The closer the enforcement is to the stateholder, the more
malicious traffic aggregates. The more traffic aggregates, the more likely the attacker
will saturate the network resources leading to the stateholder and disrupt legitimate
users.
1.4 Why Attackers Launch DDoS Attacks
The motives behind DDoS attacks vary widely. The Internet is a public network and is
popular among people of various cultures, beliefs, ages, incomes, social classes, citizen-
ships, levels of education, and so on. Of course, this diversity brings conflicts of interest
and motives for attack.
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Compounding this, targets are becoming increasingly lucrative due to the ever-
tightening integration of the Internet with society. As testimony to this, early DDoS at-
tacks were largely motivated by adolescent machismo: attackers wanted to earn recogni-
tion, assert superiority, and exact revenge; other early attacks were proof-of-concept [44].
More recently, the motives for DDoS have expanded and now include extortion [52] and
competitive advantage [51].
DDoS attacks are common because they are both easy to launch and effective.
Launching a DDoS attack is a straightforward task, and is well-documented in [13]. To
summarize, an attacker creates “zombies” by compromising a large collection of hosts,
instructs those zombies to join the botnet by contacting the command-and-control node,
then issues the order to attack. Sophisticated software to automate the whole process—
including source code released under the GPL open-source license—is readily available.
Compromising hosts is straightforward due to the transparency of the Internet combined
with shared vulnerabilities among many hosts. Controlling zombies is straightforward
because hosts on the Internet are typically high-powered general-purpose computing
platforms (due to the end-to-end nature of the Internet). Compromised hosts are not
quickly cleaned up because each machine is usually owned or operated by a different
individual, making it difficult to contact those who would be responsible for the clean-
up. Thus, zombies are easy to recruit, easy to control, and can remain in the botnet
ranks for a long time.
In addition to lack of direct control over defenses mentioned in section 1.1, DDoS
attacks are effective because the task of filling up a link with garbage traffic is easily
parallelizable among many machines. It does not matter how little traffic each node
can source as long as the total amount of traffic is enough to saturate the target link.
In fact, many nodes (each sourcing little traffic) can be more effective than a few nodes
(each sourcing a lot of traffic) due to the increased challenge in the typically manual
process of identifying and implementing filters for each attacking node.
The one mitigating factor is the visibility of the attacks. Victims know when they
are under attack, giving them opportunity to respond by implementing technological
countermeasures and contacting law enforcement. In addition, launching an attack can
tip off the owners of zombie machines and encourage them to fix any security vulnera-
bilities.2 Finally, visibility encourages security researchers from academia, government,
and industry to develop defensive mechanisms.
1.5 Defending against DDoS Attacks
A good DDoS defense has the following properties:
1. Minimal impact on legitimate users. The end-user performance obtained when
2However, residential users—the stereotypical zombie owners due to a lack of trained network se-
curity personnel in the home—rarely have monetary incentives to repair a compromised machine. Few
residential Internet users are charged bandwidth usage fees by their ISPs—service fees are by-and-large
flat-rate.
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the DDoS defense mechanism is deployed should not be significantly degraded
from the performance without the DDoS defense. DDoS attacks are much more
rare than legitimate sessions, and will be even more rare with an effective defense.
Even a small performance degradation can result in the cure being worse than the
disease.
In addition, the defensive mechanism should have very few false positives.
Filtering by IP address may not be good enough—a legitimate user and a zombie
might use the same IP address because they are both on the same machine, behind
the same NAT device, using the same proxy, or they were assigned the same
address at different times.
2. The defensive mechanisms are not themselves subject to attack. For example, if a
defensive mechanism requires manual intervention when under attack, attackers
can still inflict damage in the form of increased labor costs.
3. Support for arbitrary applications. Defenses that only interoperate with specific
applications increase the cost of switching to newer, better applications. Gen-
erality is the key to preventing the ossification of protocols and the stunting of
innovation.
4. Malicious traffic is dropped early. Bystanders are frequently caught in DDoS at-
tacks targeted at someone else because they are topologically close to the intended
victim. Dropping malicious traffic near the source minimizes collateral damage
and reduces the network management costs imposed by malicious traffic.
5. Inexpensive to deploy, maintain, and scale. Forcing a victim to spend large
amounts of money on defenses is a form of denial-of-service attack.
Upon the launch of a large DDoS attack, a common defensive reaction often
comes from the victim’s ISP: “Lacking more advanced infrastructure/tools, most ISPs
primarily mitigate attacks by filtering all traffic to the victim,” said Arbor Networks in
a September 2006 news release [12]. This defense obviously prevents legitimate users
from reaching the service, but it also prevents the DDoS attack from disabling the ISP’s
other customers. From the perspective of the ISP, dropping malicious traffic early is
the most important property when there is a lot of attack traffic because it minimizes
collateral damage. The victim is sacrificed early to save the ISP’s other customers
simply because the ISP neither has the ability to distinguish between good and bad
traffic nor the capacity to let the traffic flow without impacting other customers.
One of the victim’s possible responses is to scale the network surrounding the
unreachable node to handle the load. This can be done by simply purchasing more
capacity from the ISP, by moving the node to a larger ISP, or by obtaining service
from multiple ISPs. This defensive response minimally impacts users, is not subject to
attack, and supports arbitrary applications, but fails to drop attack traffic early and
can be expensive to deploy. The cost of upgrading the network depends on the amount
16
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of traffic that must be supported. According to Arbor Networks, “ISPs now regularly
report attacks beyond than [sic] capacity of core backbone circuits in the 10-20Gbps
range” [12]. It is difficult to purchase network service capable of sinking this amount
of traffic in a single location, especially at prices within reach of small or medium
businesses.
Instead, many at-risk organizations elect distributed approaches that both simplify
the problem of scaling up connectivity as well as enable cost savings from statistical
aggregation with others. Companies such as Akamai and Prolexic Technologies sell
services that enable their customers to sink significant amounts of traffic on demand.
These companies have partnerships with numerous ISPs to increase the total amount of
traffic they can sink. They distribute devices—caching web proxies in the case of Akamai
and proprietary packet filters in the case of Prolexic—to process the load close to the
source. The cost of deploying and maintaining the extensive infrastructure is amortized
over several customers, making their services inexpensive enough to be a worthwhile
investment for at-risk organizations. However, these services are not general: they either
support a limited set of applications (such as static web content) or do sophisticated
higher-layer processing to identify which packets are good and which are bad without
input from the ultimate destination.
Anycast is another distributed approach to scale connectivity. It is discussed in
detail in the following section and in section 2.2. Stateful Anycast, summarized in
section 1.7, is an attempt to improve upon the limitations of anycast, and is designed
to have all of the properties of a good DDoS defense listed above.
In the long run, the best way to defend against DDoS attacks is to either re-
duce attack effectiveness through architectural changes in the Internet or increase the
difficulty of launching attacks through better end-node security.
1.6 Anycast as a DDoS Defense
Anycast is a packet delivery service that can be utilized to distribute load among a group
of identically-configured machines. Anycast is unique in that the network itself chooses
which group member will be the recipient of a sender’s packet, outside the control of
the sender or receiver. This gives anycast an interesting security advantage: distributed
attacking nodes are unable to target a specific group member.
1.6.1 Anycast Defined
Anycast is perhaps easiest to understand when defined by contrasting it with other
routing services: unicast is one to one, broadcast is one to all, multicast is one to all
of a defined subset, and anycast is one to any of a defined subset. This definition is
incomplete, however, as it allows some subtle but significant variations in what can be
considered an anycast routing service. For the purposes of this document, the general
notion of anycast is defined as a routing service with the following two properties:
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1. packets sent to a group of hosts are delivered to only one member of the group
(with best-effort reliability), and
2. the routing infrastructure—not the sender—selects which group member will re-
ceive a packet sent to the group.
Note that this definition of anycast makes no guarantees about which group mem-
ber will receive a packet. For instance, a packet could be delivered to the current closest
member (for some definition of “closest”), or it could be delivered to a pseudorandomly
selected member. A sequence of packets sent by a single host could all be delivered to
the same member, or they could be delivered to several different members. The actual
behavior of an implemented anycast service depends on the topology of the network and
the implementation details of the underlying routing protocols. For example, IP anycast
generally selects a packet’s recipient based on topological closeness to the sender. For
a full discussion on how IP anycast works on the Internet, see section 2.2.
This definition is also silent on the configuration of each host in the group. While
it is typical for each host to be configured as identically as possible, this is not a require-
ment. Configuring each group member identically can provide an illusion of a single,
well-connected host—a desirable property when the goal is to handle large traffic loads.
Because handling large traffic loads is an important goal for any DDoS defense, the rest
of this document assumes that all group members are configured to behave identically
when interacting with the outside world.
These two properties have their advantages and disadvantages; the more significant
of each are discussed below.
1.6.2 How Anycast Helps with DDoS
Anycast’s most significant benefit (from a DDoS mitigation perspective) is its ability to
distribute packets to group members in a way that is outside the control of the sender.
Should a malicious collection of nodes decide to send a flood of packets to an anycast
address, the packets can be diffused among the group members to balance the load
and prevent any one group member from being taken down. The number of malicious
packets received per group member depends only on the topology of the network and
the routing protocol employed by the network—not on any information supplied by the
sender.
With careful analysis of the network’s topology and route selection algorithms,
and with reasonable estimates for the quantity, location, and capabilities of malicious
sources, it is possible to engineer the distribution of attack traffic among the group
members. As long as it is easy to place group members at strategic locations in the
network, anycast can be an effective way to absorb the heavy load of a DDoS attack.
By distributing load to multiple group members, anycast provides a way to pro-
vide a service that appears to be running on a single, powerful end node with a high-
bandwidth connection to the network. All that is needed is to configure the group
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members to provide the same behavior to the rest of the network. With all group mem-
bers offering the same service, members become indiscernible and an illusion of a single
node is formed. With this configuration, upgrading the network is no longer the only
way to defend against network resource DDoS attacks: a similar effect can be achieved
by adding additional nodes to the anycast group.
1.6.3 Anycast’s Big Limitation
The most significant disadvantage of anycast is the lack of support for stateful con-
versations. In a multiple-packet conversation, the two conversing nodes typically must
hold some private information about the state of the conversation for the duration of
the conversation. If the packet recipient changes mid-conversation, the new recipient
will not have the same state as the original recipient and will therefore be unable to
continue the conversation.
When a stateful session is initiated with an anycast group, the state resides on
a single group member. If future packets are not delivered to that particular group
member, the session is unable to continue.
1.7 Improving Upon Anycast: Stateful Anycast
Stateful Anycast adds support for stateful sessions to regular anycast. All incoming
packets belonging to the same stateful session are delivered to the same group member.
This is done with a two-stage approach: First, packets are delivered to an anycasted
set of middleboxes called anycast proxies. Next, the proxies forward the packets to the
appropriate group members. For each incoming packet, the receiving anycast proxy
determines which session the packet belongs to, determines which group member is the
stateholder for that session, and forwards the packet.
A packet is matched to a session by examining an embedded session identifier. Ses-
sion identifiers are required to be present in all packets produced by a stateful protocol.
Most existing stateful protocols already have these identifiers in every packet—TCP’s
session identifier is the quadruple composed of the source and destination address and
port.
A session is matched to a stateholder by looking up the session identifier in a
distributed database of identifier-to-stateholder mappings. If the mapping does not
exist, or if the identifier is mapped to a reject instruction, the packet is dropped. Group
members are responsible for maintaining their own mapping entries.
The use of a mapping database allows group members to defend against DDoS
attacks by revoking malicious sessions. Identifying malicious senders is easiest at the
group members because they have the greatest ability to understand a sender’s intent. In
addition, putting the responsibility of revoking malicious sessions on the group members
agrees with the end-to-end arguments and allows Stateful Anycast to remain relatively
simple and general.
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While the decision to revoke is made by the group members, revocation is enforced
at the anycast proxies. Since the anycast proxies form an anycast group and IP anycast
generally selects the closest member to receive a packet, enforcement at the proxies
means that malicious traffic is dropped close to the sender.
The two-stage indirection approach allows Stateful Anycast to scale to support
a large number of groups, group members, and proxies. Stateful Anycast can benefit
from statistical aggregation, allowing many groups to share the cost of deploying and
maintaining the anycast proxies. In addition, Stateful Anycast can provide Akamai-like
improved performance during times of peace thanks to the ability to connect remote
users with the closest non-busy group member.
Altogether, Stateful Anycast is an effective, practical, and general DDoS mitiga-
tion mechanism.
1.8 Organizational Overview
The rest of this document is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides background
information and descriptions of related work. Chapter 3 details the design of State-
ful Anycast. Chapter 4 provides an evaluation of the design of Stateful Anycast and
comments on its ability to mitigate DDoS attacks. Chapter 5 discusses the design of
the currently in-development software to use on anycast proxies and group members.
Chapter 6 concludes with some final remarks and suggestions for future work.
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Background and Related Work
This chapter provides background related to Stateful Anycast. Sections 2.1 through 2.5
discuss technologies employed by Stateful Ancyast. Section 2.6 lists some previous work
in anycast and DDoS mitigation.
2.1 BGP: Global Unicast Routing on the Internet
IP anycast works by taking advantage of existing unicast routing protocols. To under-
stand how IP anycast packets are delivered to a particular group member, it is helpful
to understand how unicast packets are routed through the Internet.
On a global scale, routes are selected using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
[65]. BGP divides the Internet into independently operated networks called Autonomous
Systems (ASes). BGP controls the routing of packets among these ASes, but leaves the
task of routing packets within an AS to the operator of the AS. The separation between
inter- and intra-AS routing protocols aids scalability and allows each AS operator to
design and operate the local network according to local needs. The topology connecting
ASes can be arbitrary. AS operators agree to connect with each other according to their
needs and economic interests.
ASes can be classified into different types. Peterson and Davie [57] classify ASes
into three broad categories based on their connectivity and their willingness to transport
traffic from one neighboring AS to another:
 Stub ASes are only connected to one other AS. The neighboring AS is typically an
Internet service provider (ISP) selling connectivity to the stub AS operator. Any
packets in the stub AS that are not destined to a host in the stub AS are passed to
its single neighbor. These ASes are uncommon because the hosts in a stub AS can
simply be a part of the neighbor’s AS and use a subset of its advertised address
space instead. Becoming a part of an existing AS is easier to initially set up, plus
it does not consume extra resources in routers around the Internet (a significant
benefit given BGP’s difficulty in supporting many ASes).
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 Multihomed ASes have multiple neighboring ASes but do not allow packets to pass
through from one neighbor to another. Multihoming provides multiple BGP-level
paths between the hosts inside the AS and hosts outside the AS. Multihomed ASes
are often operated by companies that desire redundant connectivity in order to
improve the reliability and performance of the services they provide [11].
Creating a multihomed AS to achieve rich connectivity is disfavored because
the same effect can usually be achieved without creating another AS: The multi-
homed network operator can use a block of IP addresses assigned by the network’s
primary ISP but ask its other ISP(s) to also advertise that block.
 Transit ASes are connected to multiple ASes and provide packet transit from one
neighboring AS to another. ASes of this type are usually operated by larger ISPs.
For an illustration of these three, see figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Example Autonomous System topology illustrating the various AS
types. The black squares represent BGP border routers. The lines between the
border routers represent inter-AS links.
A router that connects an AS with a neighbor AS is called a border router. The
black squares in figure 2.1 represent border routers in the example AS topology. Bor-
der routers can be thought of as having two sides: an outward side that leads to the
neighboring AS’s border router and an inward side that leads to the hosts and routers
in the AS.
In addition to its packet forwarding duties, a border router sends messages to its
neighboring AS to advertise the block(s) of IP addresses it is willing to accept. These
advertisements are repeated from AS to AS, allowing each AS throughout the Internet
to discover which neighbors can be used to deliver a packet to an advertised destination.
Accompanying a BGP advertisement is a list of ASes traversed by the advertise-
ment. Each AS adds itself to this list when it relays the advertisement to a neighbor.
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When an AS receives advertisements for the same IP address block from multiple neigh-
bors, it can refer to this list to help it make an informed decision about which route is
“best”. “Best” is not determined entirely by topology or other technological matters;
instead, the economics of network interconnection play a dominant role in choosing
which neighbor an AS will use for forwarding packets it cannot deliver itself. However,
because the cost of delivering a packet roughly correlates with the number of hops, it
is reasonable to assume that the path selected by BGP is approximately the shortest in
the topological sense (i.e., the fewest number of hops).
BGP is designed to be resilient to topology changes. Whenever the topology
changes (due to, e.g., a link failure), update messages are propagated to the ASes
affected by the change. Routers receive these updates and recalculate the paths used to
deliver packets. Thus, two packets sent from a given host A to a different host B could
traverse different paths depending on the dynamics inside the network. The topology
of the Internet today is generally stable due to the prevalence of fixed, non-mobile
infrastructure. Thus, over a window of a few seconds, it is improbable that packets
between two given hosts will traverse significantly different paths.
As links become more ephemeral due to improvements in wireless and mobile
technologies, and as routing decisions incorporate rapidly-changing dynamics such as
congestion [15], route stability will likely decrease. For unicast, lower route stability
can mean increased jitter and out-of-order packet delivery, which can negatively impact
real-time Internet applications. As explained in the next section, lower route stability
also harms IP anycast’s ability to support stateful sessions.
2.2 IP Anycast
IP anycast is the Internet’s anycast service. Proposed in 1993 by Partridge, Mendez,
and Milliken [53], IP anycast makes clever use of BGP to provide an anycast service
without modifying existing protocols.
BGP allows an IP anycast group to appear to be a single multicast host within
a multihomed AS. Indeed, there are many similarities between an anycast group and a
host in a multihomed AS: both use a single IP address, and the rest of the Internet sees
multiple possible routes to the IP address. The only difference is that with the host in a
multihomed AS, all of the routes to an advertised address lead to the same node; with
IP anycast, each route leads to a different member of the IP anycast group.
2.2.1 Deploying an IP Anycast Group
Because IP anycast groups are similar to multihomed ASes, IP anycast groups are
formed in a similar manner to multihomed ASes. The group operator first identifies the
desired points of attachment (one for each group member), enters agreements with the
AS operators at those points of attachment, and connects border routers to these points.
Each of these border routers is configured to advertise the same block of IP addresses.
However, unlike the border routers in a multihomed AS, the inward sides of the anycast
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group’s border routers are not attached together via an intra-AS network. Instead, the
inward side of each router is attached to one or more anycast group members. Each
group member is typically configured identically to provide the illusion of a single node
inside a multihomed AS. The border router–group member pairs are like a simple stub
AS that has been cloned and distributed. See figure 2.2 for an illustration.
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Figure 2.2: Example Autonomous System topology with IP anycast group mem-
bers. Both anycast group members use the same AS identifier and advertise
reachability to the same block of IP addresses, preventing the other ASes in the
topology from distinguishing the anycast group from a single unicast host in a
multihomed AS. Compare to figure 2.1.
Deploying a new IP anycast group member can be nontrivial. There are two chal-
lenges that must be overcome by the anycast group operator. First, a good attachment
point must be located. Choosing the right adjacent network can make a significant
performance difference [11]. Poor placement of the group member could prevent it from
capturing a good fraction of the overall traffic load, while good placement can result
in a relatively even traffic distribution among group members. Second, an agreement
has to be reached with the operator of the adjacent AS. Typically, the agreement is
based on a customer–provider relationship, but ISP customers do not typically have
their own AS and IP address block. The customers that do are either large or have
uncommon requirements, prompting specially negotiated pricing [19]. Accommodating
a customer that has its own AS number and runs its own BGP is a straightforward but
manual process involving some router configuration changes. Thus, getting Internet
service for a new group member is not as easy as signing up for generic residential- or
commercial-class Internet service.
While the discussion so far has focused on IP anycast groups deployed on a
topologically-broad scale using BGP, it is also possible to run an anycast group en-
tirely within an AS. This eliminates the need to enter into agreements with multiple
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network operators while still providing many of the same benefits, especially if traffic
is predominantly local. However, flexibility is reduced, so it may not be suitable for
evenly distributing load if there is a large number of widely distributed senders. For an
in-depth treatment of the issues involved in deploying an anycast group on the Internet,
see [5].
2.2.2 IP Anycast Usage Today
While a full survey of the usage of IP anycast is difficult due to the challenge of dis-
tinguishing between an anycast group and a host in a multihomed network, there are
a few known notable uses of IP anycast today. These uses include: replicating root
DNS servers to improve reliability and performance [7, 8, 27], sinking meaningless DNS
queries before they reach the public DNS infrastructure [6], and simplifying the process
of locating special hosts called 6to4 gateways that are used to aid in the transition from
IPv4 to IPv6 [20,29]. Note that all of these are stateless services.
Replicating the root DNS servers is partially done in response to the DDoS threat
[26]. In October 2002, a DDoS attack was launched that disabled several of the root DNS
servers [24, 73]. A much smaller attack took place in February of 2007 that disrupted
two of the root servers [32, 42]. While neither attack caused a noticeable degradation
in overall DNS performance, DDoS attacks have prompted accelerated infrastructure
upgrades [73]. The primary mode of upgrade is to deploy additional root DNS servers
via anycast, largely due to a technical issue that limits the number of root DNS IP
addresses to thirteen.
2.2.3 Characteristics of IP Anycast
IP anycast’s characteristics are strongly influenced by its use of BGP. One effect of
using BGP is that IP anycast shares the same address space as IP unicast. The routing
infrastructure is unable to differentiate between an IP unicast host and an IP anycast
group, so there is no requirement to set aside a part of the IP address space for use
by IP anycast groups. An anycast group can use whatever unicast IP address it has
available. It is therefore possible to convert a single-node service to an anycasted multi-
node service without changing the IP address used to reach the service. While there
is no longer a strong need to operate a service on a particular IP address due to the
prevalence of the domain name system (DNS), this may be useful for when DNS is
unavailable or for legacy applications that use hard-coded or manually-configured IP
addresses.
More significantly, the use of BGP to implement anycast results in packets being
delivered to the topologically closest group member. As with multihomed networks,
routers on the Internet hear the advertisements for the block of IP addresses and lo-
cally decide which route is best. The route to an anycast group member is decided
under the belief that the advertisements indicate alternate paths to the same network,
when in reality the different advertisements correspond to physically distinct devices.
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The particular anycast member selected by a router is typically the topologically clos-
est member, subject to the economically-motivated constraints that network operators
impose on routing decisions.
Because routes are generally determined by topological closeness, an anycast group
member will sink the traffic sourced in the topological region surrounding it. Using the
terminology of Abley and Lindqvist [5], the Internet is divided into catchments, each of
which “drains” to a particular anycast host. See figure 2.3 for an illustration.
Figure 2.3: Illustration of anycast catchments. The blob represents the entire
Internet. Grey circles represent anycast group members. Catchment boundaries
are illustrated with dotted lines. Traffic sourced by a host inside a catchment
will be delivered to the anycast group member in the catchment. The location
of catchment boundaries is determined by routers deciding which group member
is “best”.
One consequence of routing based on topological closeness is short-term consis-
tency in the recipient of packets sent to the group. The only way the recipient group
member will change is if the topology changes in a way that causes a catchment bound-
ary to move underneath the sender. Because the topology of the Internet changes slowly,
catchment boundaries change slowly. Thus, in the short term, a sender’s sequence of
packets will likely be delivered to the same anycast group member. Possible topology-
changing events include the addition or removal of network links, the addition or removal
of anycast group members, or sender mobility. The amount of time a sender can expect
to reach the same group member with high probability depends on how rapidly the
network changes and where the changes are relative to the sender.
There is considerable debate over whether routing is stable enough to deploy
stateful services over IP anycast [38]. Route selection is generally stable thanks to a
largely fixed, wired infrastructure. However, there are at least three trends that will
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likely reduce route consistency: the widespread adoption of routing algorithms that
base decisions on rapidly-changing factors such as congestion or instantaneous load
rather than slowly-changing factors such as topology [15], an increase in the use of
dynamically established links made possible by wireless networking technologies, and
the ubiquitization of mobile devices and protocols. As these changes occur, IP anycast’s
ability to support stateful sessions will diminish due to a lower probability of delivering
all of a session’s packets to the same group member.
Another consequence of routing based on topological closeness is providers have
a coarse, non-dynamic means of adjusting the distribution of traffic per anycast group
member. Through the choice of attachment point, the group operator can influence the
size and location of the catchments and therefore the approximate distribution of traffic
per anycast host. For example, an overloaded group member can have its catchment
reduced by placing other group members nearby. However, operators are unable to
fine-tune the load distribution—especially in response to dynamic conditions—so they
should carefully identify the most strategic attachment points based on current and
expected loads.
Yet another consequence of routing based on topological closeness is that the net-
work does the minimal amount of work necessary to deliver a packet to a group member.
This is important for suppressing DDoS attacks because traffic is terminated near the
source (assuming a good number of well-distributed group members). This is also ben-
eficial for normal operation, as it can result in improved latency, jitter, bandwidth, and
reliability between the sender and the service provided by the anycast group.
2.2.4 Limitations of IP Anycast
In addition to the lack of support for stateful sessions discussed in section 1.6.3, IP
anycast has limitations stemming from the details of its implementation:
 Security: Because IP anycast is implemented using BGP, IP anycast inherits the
same well-known vulnerabilities present in BGP [50]. Fortunately, it can bene-
fit from the same defensive mechanisms [28, 36, 68]. One possible attack involves
an adversary advertising the block of IP addresses used by the anycast service.
This would cause some of the traffic to be diverted to a destination of the ad-
versary’s choosing. Authenticating BGP advertisements from neighboring routers
can reduce this particular risk.
 Availability: To ensure the continued availability of an anycasted service, care
must be taken to ensure that a group member’s route is withdrawn when that
group member is incapable of providing the service. If this does not happen, hosts
in the catchment served by the group member will be unable to access the service.
If the route is successfully withdrawn, hosts previously served by the dis-
abled group member will be automatically directed toward an alternate group
member once the BGP route selection process converges. However, BGP can take
a long time to converge on routes [37], so anycast packets may be dropped for
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several minutes after the withdrawal. To minimize the likelihood of needing to
issue a BGP route withdrawal, redundant group members should be deployed at
each network attachment point. Under normal operation, packets arriving at the
attachment point would be routed to any one of the redundant group members.
If a group member fails, incoming anycast packets would be routed to an alter-
nate group member at the attachment point, preventing the need to withdraw the
BGP route. Abley [8] describes one particular redundant topology designed to
maximize uptime.
 Primitive group member selection: Group member selection is based on topological
closeness, not on metrics such as workload, latency, available bandwidth, packet
loss, etc. Thus, the network cannot automatically balance the traffic load among
the group members for optimal performance.
 Scalability: A major issue hindering the adoption of IP anycast is difficulty scaling
in the number of anycast groups. An anycast group looks just like a multihomed
network to the routing infrastructure, and the Internet’s difficulty in supporting
numerous multihomed networks is well known [4, 16, 31, 76]. Routes to the any-
cast group members cannot be aggregated with routes to other networks, so each
anycast group requires its own unique routing table entry on every router in the
Internet. Thus, the size of a router’s forwarding table scales linearly with the
number of IP anycast groups [43].
To minimize the amount of very expensive, very fast memory used to store
forwarding tables in routers, network operators typically ignore advertisements for
small blocks of IP addresses. By ignoring small blocks of IP addresses, network
operators exclude all but the largest players. Thus, in order to obtain reachability
throughout the Internet, an IP anycast group operator must obtain a large block
of IP addresses even if only one IP address is required for the service. These large
blocks consume a significant portion of the scarce IPv4 address space remaining.
Three proposals described later in this chapter—PIAS (section 2.3), i3 (section
2.4), and GIA (section 2.2)—address some of these problems.
2.3 Proxy IP Anycast Service (PIAS)
PIAS [14] is an IP anycast service designed to scale in the number of anycast groups.
PIAS is the foundation for Stateful Anycast, so a good deal of discussion is warranted.
The core idea behind PIAS is to break the packet delivery process into two stages.
The first stage uses “native” IP anycast to deliver a packet to an anycast proxy. The
proxy then finishes the job by tunneling the packet to a target host via unicast. See
figure 2.4 for an illustration.
Each PIAS anycast proxy is a member of a normal IP anycast group. Because they
are IP anycast group members, the proxies advertise a common block of IP addresses to
28
2.3. Proxy IP Anycast Service (PIAS)
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Sender
Anycast Proxy
Group Member
Figure 2.4: Packet delivery in PIAS. There are two distinct packet delivery
stages. In the first stage, packets from a sender are delivered to the PIAS anycast
proxy (which is a normal IP anycast group member) in the sender’s catchment.
The anycast proxy then chooses a PIAS group member and forwards the packet
to the group member. The chosen group member can be located anywhere in
the Internet.
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the rest of the Internet via BGP. Each anycast group served by the proxies is assigned an
IP address from this block. When a packet arrives at the anycast proxy in the sender’s
catchment, the proxy uses the destination IP address to identify the corresponding
anycast group, selects a member from that group, and tunnels the packet to the group
member’s unicast address by encapsulating the anycast packet inside a unicast packet.
The group member then unwraps the encapsulated packet and injects it into the kernel’s
routing subsystem to be processed. Return packets follow the reverse path: group
members tunnel return packets to the proxies where they are unwrapped and sent to
the recipient.
The collection of anycast proxies that announces the same block would be operated
by a single organization. Group members in PIAS register with the anycast proxies when
they start up to let the proxies know where they can be reached. To prevent malicious
users from siphoning a portion of the anycast traffic, there must be a relationship of trust
between the operators of the proxies and the group members. This precludes random
individuals from contributing to the pool of anycast proxies without coordination and
mutual trust; instead, a single organization—an anycast service provider—would deploy
and manage the proxies. It also precludes random individuals from establishing a PIAS
anycast group without obtaining prior permission from the anycast service provider.
While these are unfortunate limitations, deployment is still feasible because of PIAS’s
marketable features, some of which are described below.
2.3.1 Properties of PIAS
This indirection approach has several advantages over regular IP anycast, all of which
are inherited by Stateful Anycast:
 Scalable in the number of groups: A single route in the Internet’s routing fabric
is enough to support an arbitrary number of groups. Routers only need to know
a route to an anycast proxy in order to support all of the groups served by the
proxy. No longer do routers need to know a route per group.
 Keeps group members isolated from the routing infrastructure: With normal IP
anycast, the routing infrastructure must keep track of all of the group members.
It also has to recalculate routes when a group member is withdrawn or added.
While these are not major costs, the anycast proxies in PIAS take over the re-
sponsibility. Routers on the Internet only need to deal with the anycast proxies,
which, if configured well, can be made quite reliable to reduce the frequency of
route announcements or withdrawals. Shielding group members also provides
some operational secrecy for group operators.
 Efficient use of the IP address space: Rather than each group having its own
large block of IP addresses regardless of the number of addresses actually used
(see section 2.2), all groups share a single block of IP addresses. This allows for
the dense packing of IP anycast addresses.
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 Advanced routing: The anycast proxies can choose a recipient group member based
on metrics other than topological proximity. Such metrics can include latency,
packet loss, or even workload.
 Easy group management: Group members can easily relocate without complicated
reconfiguration. This allows group operators to easily move group members to new
Internet providers as they quest for ideal locality and service price. All that is
needed to deploy a new group member is a basic Internet connection combined
with software to tunnel packets to and from the anycast proxies. Group members
could even operate behind a NAT [22] device, assuming the tunneling protocol is
NAT-traversable.
 Amortized costs: Adding a new anycast proxy benefits all PIAS anycast groups.
Together, a moderate number of groups can justify a large deployment of anycast
proxies. More proxies means better routing efficiency and a better ability to drop
unwanted traffic early.
 Few modifications necessary: There is no need to modify client software, router
software, or routing protocols to deploy PIAS. However, group members do need
to run software to initiate an association with the proxies and tunnel packets to
and from the proxies.
 Incrementally deployable: Anycast proxies, groups supported by the proxies, and
group members can all be added one at a time. Small deployments still pro-
vide improved performance and protection, so there is no need for heavy initial
investments.
 Support for advanced features: Because the anycast proxies are “inside” the net-
work, they provide a great location for adding advanced features to the network.
For example, Firebreak [25] drops unwanted traffic early by simply placing firewall
rules in the anycast proxies.
This property is the primary reason why PIAS was selected as the scalable
basis for Stateful Anycast. Anycast proxies provide the ideal location for the
placement of session lookup and revocation enforcement services in order to con-
struct an anycast service that supports stateful conversations in a DDoS-resistant
way.
PIAS’s approach also has a few disadvantages, also inherited by Stateful Anycast:
 Slight routing inefficiency: Just like all indirection architectures, packets suffer
from triangle routing. Packets must first travel from the source to the anycast
proxy, then travel from the proxy to the destination. This extra stop between the
source and destination can lengthen the path traveled by the packet. Longer paths
often mean higher latency, higher latency variability, and a greater likelihood of
encountering congestion. However, because the anycast proxies are selected by
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BGP, an anycast proxy receiving a packet is likely to be the closest proxy to the
sender. Thus, the anycast proxy should be close to the direct source-to-destination
forwarding path, resulting in a minimal packet detour.
 Lower reliability: Anycast proxies are another point of failure. However, with
careful design, they may be able to actually improve reliability by quickly detecting
a group member failure and routing packets to alternate members.
 Managed by a single organization: As discussed above, the anycast proxies must
be managed by a single organization that offers the service to others.
 Group member modification: Because group members receive packets from the
anycast proxies via a tunnel, they must have software to wrap and unwrap tunneled
packets. However, application server software running on group members should
not need modification.
 Security by unknown IP address: To prevent a targeted attack on a group mem-
ber, the group member’s unicast IP address must be kept secret. However, if
a group member’s IP address is exposed, that group member can be removed
from the group. In addition, because group members utilize commodity Internet
connections, an exposed group member can be quickly relocated to a different
attachment point with a different IP address.
As an interesting aside, PIAS can be used to provide a scalable alternative to AS
multihoming. This is not surprising given the fact that an IP anycast group appears
to be a single host in a multihomed AS and PIAS is designed to provide a scalable
alternative to IP anycast. To construct a multihomed network, a PIAS group operator
configures the group members to unload the unwrapped encapsulated packets onto a
local network. A reply to an incoming packet follows the reverse path: it is routed
through the local network back to the group member that received the incoming packet,
then encapsulated and sent to the anycast proxy that originally forwarded the incoming
packet. Sending a reply packet via the same path as the incoming packet is not necessary
for correctness, but should provide the best performance since the incoming path is likely
to be the shortest.
2.3.2 Scalability of PIAS
PIAS moves the challenges of managing a large number of groups, a large number of
group members, and group membership dynamics off of the Internet’s routing infras-
tructure and onto the anycast proxies where they can be addressed in a scalable way.
PIAS isn’t just shifting the problem to a new location; the challenges become manage-
able by moving them to the proxies. There are many valid approaches for dealing with
size and dynamics in a scalable way, and PIAS chooses one particular method described
in [14]. For discussion on how Stateful Anycast scales, see section 4.3.
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2.4 Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3)
Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3) [69] is an overlay routing service designed to
generalize the idea of indirection in routing. Rather than a single level of network-
controlled indirection as in PIAS, i3 allows for multiple levels of recipient-controlled
indirection. As a result of the indirection, i3 easily supports host mobility, multicast,
and anycast.
Senders do not address packets to the topological location of the intended recipient;
rather, packets are addressed to a recipient-determined rendezvous point in the overlay
network. Recipients establish the rendezvous point by inserting a trigger into the overlay
network. In the most basic form of the abstraction, this trigger is a pair consisting of an
overlay network rendezvous point identifier and the recipient’s unicast IP address. The
identifiers are m-bit binary strings with no inherent meaning. If the recipient’s address
changes due to host mobility, it can simply update the trigger.
When a sender injects a packet into the i3 overlay network destined to a certain
identifier, the overlay attempts to find any triggers corresponding to the destination
identifier in the packet. If one is found, the network takes the packet and forwards it
to the recipient indicated in the trigger. If multiple triggers are found, a copy of the
packet is sent to each recipient, providing a very simple multicast service.
To support anycast, the identifier bits are divided into two groups. The first k bits
of the identifier can be thought of as the anycast group identifier, while the lower-order
(m − k) bits can be thought of as the group member identifier. A trigger matches an
identifier if the first k bits match and there is no other trigger with a longer prefix match.
To send a packet to a member of the anycast group, the sender ensures that the first k
bits of the identifier in the packet match the first k bits of the identifiers used by the
anycast group members. The remaining (m − k) bits of the identifier can be random.
When i3 receives the packet, it chooses the group member based on the trigger that has
the longest prefix match of the (m−k) bits. It is not clear what happens when multiple
unique triggers have equal-length prefix matches.
Note that this is not quite anycast as defined in section 1.6.1. The selection of
a group member is not determined by the routing infrastructure. Instead, the group
member is determined using the identifier provided by the sender, making the choice of
recipient group member completely controllable by the sender. An attacker can exploit
this fact to target and take out one group member at a time through packet flooding.
Even worse, if the attack traffic causes a group member to be withdrawn, all attack
traffic will be automatically diverted to an alternate group member. Thus, anycast in
i3 is unsuitable for mitigating DDoS attacks without an additional mechanism.
Fortunately, i3 can be easily modified to support a true anycast service through
simple changes to the syntax and semantics of triggers. One possibility would be to
create a new kind of trigger that maps an identifier to a set of destination addresses
(and/or other identifiers). When an identifier matches the trigger (completely), i3 would
choose one destination from the set and forward the packet to the chosen destination as
usual. The particular choice could be made randomly or according to some metric such
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as group member workload or the estimated topological distance to a group member.
While i3’s anycast service alone may not be suitable for mitigating DDoS attacks,
i3’s unicast service can be combined with PIAS to provide support for stateful sessions.
In Stateful Anycast, the anycast proxies use an i3-like overlay network to direct packets
that are a part of a stateful session to the appropriate stateholder. This arrangement
is explained further in section 3.10.5.
i3 can be implemented on top of any suitable overlay network. The authors
chose to build i3 on top of Chord [70], a structured peer-to-peer overlay network that
implements a distributed hash table (DHT). This type of overlay network, described
below, was chosen for its excellent scalability and reliability properties.
2.5 Distributed Hash Tables and Structured Peer-to-Peer
Overlay Networks
A distributed hash table (DHT) is simply a way to store key–value pairs in a distributed,
scalable manner. Stateful Anycast relies on a DHT to store mappings between a session
identifier (the key) and the session’s stateholder (the value) in a scalable, robust manner
(see section 3.10.5).
DHTs support three basic operations:
 put(key, value) puts the value value into the hash table at the position identified
by key. If there is already a value associated with key, the value is replaced with
value.
 value← get(key) fetches the value stored in the hash table at the position identified
by key.
 remove(key) removes the value stored in the hash table at the position identified
by key.
Each node participating in the DHT is responsible for a fraction of the key space.
When a put, get, or remove request is made, the request is routed through a structured
peer-to-peer overlay network formed by the nodes participating in the DHT. The request
is eventually delivered to the node that is responsible for the fraction of the keyspace
containing the key.
Efficient overlay network routing algorithms give DHTs their scalability and per-
formance. There are several well-known algorithms, including CAN [64], Chord [70],
Kademlia [41], Pastry [66], and Tapestry [77]. All of these key-based routing algorithms
trade diameter (the maximum number of hops to reach the destination) for degree (the
number of neighbors each node has). A higher-diameter network typically has lower
performance, while a higher-degree network may have higher management overhead
and may not scale as well. A typical overlay network has degree O(log n) and diameter
O(log n).
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2.6 Other Related Work
This section provides an incomplete list of other anycast and DDoS work.
2.6.1 Anycast
Global IP-Anycast (GIA) [34] achieves scalable anycast by mapping an anycast address
to a default unicast address so that routes to rarely used anycast addresses need not
consume router state (routers simply forward the packet to the unicast address). For
popular anycast groups, routes to nearby members are sought out and cached. GIA
requires all routers to be modified.
IAS [74] is a proposal to improve the scalability of anycast. All groups are divided
into sets by taking a hash of the anycast address modulo the desired number of sets.
Each router is assigned one of the sets and is required to know how to route to all
of the anycast groups in that set. If a router receives a packet destined to a group
outside of its assigned set, the packet is forwarded to a nearby router that is assigned
the set. IAS requires modification to every router and requires anycast addresses to be
distinguishable from unicast addresses.
Szymaniak, et al. [71] propose an anycast mechanism based on mobile-IP [55] that
supports stateful sessions. However, this mechanism reveals the unicast IP address of
its group members (the “care-of” address) and is therefore not anycast as defined in
section 1.6.1. Contact with a group member is initiated through the home agent—a
single node that can be attacked to disable the entire group.
Akamai [10] is a company that offers content distribution services. Akamai directs
a client to a nearby web cache by returning the web cache’s unicast IP address in the
DNS query response. While Akamai’s service is not anycast as defined in section 1.6.1
(senders can control which web proxy receives packets because the proxies’ unicast IP
addresses are revealed), the service can be thought of as anycast at a higher layer.
Akamai’s business model is very similar to the business model envisioned for a Stateful
Anycast service provider.
2.6.2 DDoS Mitigation
For additional references, see the survey of network-based DDoS defense mechanisms
conducted by Peng, et al. [54].
Prolexic Technologies [63] is a company that specializes in DDoS mitigation. Pro-
lexic uses proprietary filters deployed throughout its network to eliminate malicious
traffic before it is delivered to the customer. Prolexic takes advantage of statistical
aggregation to reduce the per-customer cost of maintaining a network that is capable
of identifying and sinking large malicious loads.
Traffic Validation Architecture (TVA) [75] is a proposal that uses capabilities [39]
to verify a sender’s authorization to send packets. The capabilities are non-portable
because they are specific to the routers along the path from sender to receiver. The
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capabilities also expire, allowing a receiver to revoke a malicious session by refusing to
renew the sender’s capability. Unfortunately, the non-portability causes invalidation
of capabilities upon sender mobility or other topology dynamics. TVA also requires
a non-trivial deployment of TVA-aware routers before DDoS attacks are substantially
mitigated.
Firebreak [25] is a proposed distributed firewall system with the ability to drop
traffic close to the sender. As both Firebreak and Stateful Anycast are built on top of
PIAS, the two can be combined to provide the best of both systems.
dFence [40] is a proposed network-based DoS mitigation mechanism, envisioned
to be deployed by ISPs as a value-added service for their customers. When an attack
is detected, routing updates are sent to redirect all of a victim’s incoming and outgoing
traffic through special middleboxes. These middleboxes classify packets as legitimate
or malicious and drop accordingly. Besides a tight coupling with existing protocols and
the inability to obtain end-node assistance in classifying traffic, dFence is vulnerable to
a flooding attack that can take out a specific middlebox. By using the same session
identifier in every malicious packet, an attacker can direct all of the botnet’s malicious
traffic to a single middlebox, causing its links to saturate and preventing legitimate
traffic from reaching the destination.
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Stateful Anycast Design
This chapter describes the technical design of Stateful Anycast. Section 3.1 starts off
with a list of the objectives Stateful Anycast was designed to meet. Section 3.2 provides
a high-level overview of the design, followed by a couple of example packet exchanges
in section 3.3 to help the reader form a mental picture of the whole system. Sections
3.4 and 3.5 discuss how Stateful Anycast is deployed. The remaining sections discuss
specific algorithms and procedures.
3.1 Design Objectives
Stateful Anycast was designed to meet several objectives. The objectives are broken into
two types: primary and secondary. Primary objectives are required for effectiveness.
Secondary objectives are strongly desired, but not critical.
3.1.1 Primary Design Objectives
1. Support for stateful sessions: As discussed in section 1.6.2, normal anycast is
already an effective way to defend against DDoS attacks when using stateless
protocols. With stateful protocols, normal anycast is no longer a reliable option.
For Stateful Anycast to provide any benefit over normal anycast, it must be able to
direct all packets belonging to the same session to the group member participating
in the session.
2. DDoS mitigation: Stateful Anycast is primarily motivated by the need to mitigate
DDoS attacks. As such, it should have the properties mentioned in section 1.5.
Mitigating DDoS attacks while supporting stateful sessions is non-trivial
because giving the sender a handle on a particular node restores some of the
control that was originally taken away by anycast. Normal anycast strips the
ability to target a particular group member from the sender and causes attack
traffic to naturally diffuse among group members. Adding support for stateful
sessions allows the sender to source an arbitrary number of packets to the same
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group member, opening up the opportunity to to knock out individual group
members. For Stateful Anycast to be an effective means of mitigating DDoS
attacks, the sender must not have unchecked control over the choice of packet
recipient. Thus, the recipient must be able to somehow revoke sessions when they
turn malicious.
3. Scalable: Stateful Anycast must be able to scale in the number of groups, in
the number of group members (per group and total), and in group membership
dynamics.
3.1.2 Secondary Design Objectives
4. Easily deployable on the Internet: While creating a mechanism usable only on
some hypothetical network architecture may still have value, the economic and
social significance of the Internet makes deployability on the Internet an important
goal.
Specifically, Stateful Anycast should be as backwards-compatible as possible
without compromising DDoS defense capabilities. Any required client, router, or
protocol modifications would limit its value.
Ideally, Stateful Anycast would either be deployable by uncoordinated par-
ticipants (like a peer-to-peer network) or provide a strong business case for a
commercially-supported deployment. Either way, it should be incrementally de-
ployable and have low setup and operational costs.
5. Protocol generality: To help prevent layer abstraction violations and the ossifica-
tion of protocols, Stateful Anycast should ideally support arbitrary new stateful
and stateless protocols without requiring modifications to its software or proto-
cols. Barring that, Stateful Anycast should at least support the major protocols
and accommodate new protocols through simple software changes.
6. Performance and Efficiency: Stateful Anycast should route packets in the most
direct manner possible. Ideally, the path an anycast packet takes to a group
member would be the same as the path a unicast packet would take to the group
member.
An added bonus would be the ability to select a group member (for a new
session or for sessionless packets) based on advanced metrics such as group member
workload, packet loss, and latency.
3.2 Design Overview
Stateful Anycast employs an indirection approach based on PIAS [14] to match a packet
to its stateholder. An anycast packet is first delivered to an anycast proxy using normal
anycast. The proxy then matches the packet to the proper recipient group member and
forwards it using regular unicast.
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If the packet is part of a stateless protocol, any group member is chosen. The
choice of group member could be made randomly or based on an operator-chosen metric
such as topological closeness, latency, average packet loss, available bandwidth, or group
member workload.
If the packet is part of a bootstrapping stateful session such that no corresponding
state has been established in any group member yet (for example, a TCP [61] SYN
packet), the packet is treated as belonging to a stateless protocol and sent to any group
member.
If the packet is part of an established stateful session, the anycast proxy must
determine which group member is participating in the session. This is done by re-
quiring a session identifier in every packet and resolving that session identifier to the
participating group member using a directory service, discussed in section 3.10. The
group members are responsible for inserting, updating, and removing directory service
mappings as appropriate.
The directory service can be used in three different ways. First, an anycast proxy
can submit a query consisting of a session ID and wait for the reply containing the recip-
ient group member’s unicast address before forwarding the anycast packet. However, to
prevent the need to queue packets at the anycast proxies while directory service queries
are executing, the whole anycast packet can be included as part of the query. The
directory service can either deliver the packet itself once the group member has been
resolved, or return the packet back to the anycast proxy as part of the resolution results.
Each of the three methods has its advantages and disadvantages, as described in sec-
tion 3.10. Directory service query results are cached at the anycast proxies to improve
delivery performance and to help prevent the directory service from being vulnerable to
a DDoS attack.
The directory service is implemented as a structured peer-to-peer overlay network
in a manner similar to i3 (see section 2.4). The mappings between a session ID and its
associated group member are stored in a distributed hash table implemented on top of
the overlay network. The mappings are similar in concept to i3’s triggers. A query is
routed through the overlay network until it reaches the node that is storing the matching
mapping. The resolution result is then returned to the querying anycast proxy.
When delivering an anycast packet to a group member, the packet is encapsulated
inside a unicast packet. This allows the packet to be delivered without modification,
plus it provides a means for including useful metadata and cryptographic services (see
section 3.11).
3.3 Examples with TCP
To help motivate the packet processing algorithms detailed later, this section presents
two examples of what happens when a host initiates a stateful session with a Stateful
Anycast group member. The protocol used in the examples is Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) [61]. These examples discuss what happens, but not why. Justifications
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will be presented in later sections.
Both of these examples include simplifications and omissions to aid in understand-
ing the general process of establishing a session. Later sections present the complete
details.
Starting a TCP session involves three packet exchanges, called the TCP three-way
handshake. This exchange is illustrated in figure 3.1 along with each host’s TCP state
(as described in section 3.2 of [61]). First, the initiator (the client) sends a TCP SYN
packet to a host that is listening for new connection requests (the server). The server
replies with a TCP SYN/ACK packet—a packet that acknowledges the client’s SYN
and contains a SYN of its own. Once the client acknowledges the server’s SYN with a
TCP ACK packet, the session is established and either host may start sending data to
the other side.
ACK
SYN/ACK
SYN
Client Server
SYN received
Listen
SYN sent
Established
Established
Figure 3.1: TCP three-way handshake and TCP states. Arrows represent packet
journeys and time increases in the downward direction.
When Stateful Anycast is introduced, the process of starting a TCP session be-
comes considerably more complicated. Figure 3.2 shows the start of a TCP session
(handshake plus a data packet) in Stateful Anycast when no caching is employed at
the anycast proxies. In this particular example, the second packet reaches a second
anycast proxy, illustrating how Stateful Anycast can keep a TCP session running when
the receiving anycast proxy changes mid-session. The circled numbers correspond to
the following steps:
1. Anycast proxy #1 receives a TCP SYN packet from the client. Because a TCP
SYN indicates the start of a new stateful session, the proxy treats the packet as
belonging to a stateless protocol. The proxy chooses a recipient group member,
concatenates the packet with its own unicast IP address, and forwards the bundle
to the chosen group member. Figure 3.3 shows the contents of the arriving and
departing packets. See sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 for more information.
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SYN
SYN
SYN/ACK
SYN/ACK
Stateful Anycast
Proxy #1
encap(SYN/ACK)
insert+
1
encap(SYN/ACK)
2
3
4
5
ACK
encap(ACK)
query+6
encap(ACK)
ACK
DATA
encap(DATA)
DATA
7
8
9
Stateful Anycast
Proxy #2
encap(SYN)
Client
Directory
Service
Member Mgmt
Software
Group Member
Server
Software
Listen
SY
N
 se
nt
(handshake complete)
(ACK omitted)
Es
ta
bl
ish
ed
Established
SY
N
 received
Figure 3.2: The start of an example TCP session with a non-caching version of
Stateful Anycast. In this sequence, the client’s second packet reaches a second
anycast proxy. Bold arrows indicate packets containing another packet inside.
The circled numbers indicate interesting steps in the process; these steps are
described in the text.
Incoming packet:
To: group
From: client
Data: TCP SYN
Outgoing packet:
To: member
From: proxy1
Data: To: group
From: client
Data: TCP SYN
arrived at proxy proxy1
Figure 3.3: Packet contents for TCP example session (without caching), step
#1: TCP SYN packet entering anycast proxy #1 and encapsulated SYN packet
to be sent to the group member.
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2. The group member’s Stateful Anycast software receives the encapsulated anycast
packet, records that the packet came in via proxy #1, unwraps the anycast packet,
and passes the unwrapped packet to the kernel networking subsystem via a virtual
network interface. Figure 3.4 shows the contents of the arriving and departing
packets. See section 3.6.3 for more information.
Incoming packet:
To: member
From: proxy1
Data: To: group
From: client
Data: TCP SYN
arrived at proxy proxy1
Outgoing packet:
To: group
From: client
Data: TCP SYN
Figure 3.4: Packet contents for TCP example session (without caching), step
#2: Encapsulated TCP SYN packet arriving at the group member and the un-
wrapped TCP SYN packet that is passed on to the kernel networking subsystem.
Compare with figure 3.3.
3. The group member’s Stateful Anycast software receives the reply TCP SYN/ACK
through the virtual network interface. The software reads the session identifier
in the packet and forms a packet to tell the directory service to map the session
identifier to the group member’s unicast address with a limited mapping lifetime.
The software also encapsulates the SYN/ACK packet and adds it to the directory
service packet along with instructions to deliver the encapsulated packet to proxy
#1 (the anycast proxy recorded in step #2) once the directory service mapping
has been made. The TCP SYN/ACK accompanies the directory service message
in order to guarantee that the mapping has been made before the client replies
to the SYN/ACK. Figure 3.5 shows the contents of the arriving and departing
packets. See the description of the insert() functions in section 3.10.1 for more
information.
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Incoming packet:
To: client
From: group
Data: TCP SYN/ACK
Outgoing packet:
To: directoryService
From: member
Data: Map sessionID to member
with lifetime = 10 seconds.
Deliver the following to proxy1:
To: client
From: group
Data: TCP SYN/ACK
Figure 3.5: Packet contents for TCP example session (without caching), step
#3: TCP SYN/ACK generated at the group member and the encapsulated
SYN/ACK to be sent to the directory service.
4. The directory service receives the packet from the group member, inserts a map-
ping between the session ID and group member IP address, and forwards the
encapsulated packet to proxy #1. Figure 3.6 shows the contents of the arriving
and departing packets.
Incoming packet:
To: directoryService
From: member
Data: Map sessionID to member
with lifetime = 10 seconds.
Deliver the following to proxy1:
To: client
From: group
Data: TCP SYN/ACK
Outgoing packet:
To: proxy1
From: directoryService
Data: To: client
From: group
Data: TCP SYN/ACK
Figure 3.6: Packet contents for TCP example session (without caching), step
#4: The encapsulated TCP SYN/ACK packets that enter and leave the direc-
tory service.
5. Proxy #1 receives the encapsulated packet, unwraps the embedded SYN/ACK
packet, and forwards the unwrapped packet to the client. Figure 3.7 shows the
contents of the arriving and departing packets.
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Incoming packet:
To: proxy1
From: directoryService
Data: To: client
From: group
Data: TCP SYN/ACK
Outgoing packet:
To: client
From: group
Data: TCP SYN/ACK
Figure 3.7: Packet contents for TCP example session (without caching), step
#5: The encapsulated TCP SYN/ACK packet arrives at the proxy, is un-
wrapped, and sent to the client.
6. Proxy #2 receives the ACK packet from the client and recognizes this packet as
part of a stateful protocol. The proxy forms a directory service query packet.
Included in this packet is the session ID, the proxy’s unicast address, and the
ACK packet. Figure 3.8 shows the contents of the arriving and departing packets.
Incoming packet:
To: client
From: group
Data: TCP ACK
Outgoing packet:
To: directoryService
From: proxy2
Data: Query for sessionID
Deliver on resolution:
To: client
From: group
Data: TCP ACK
arrived at proxy proxy2
Figure 3.8: Packet contents for TCP example session (without caching), step
#6: The client’s ACK packet arrives at a different proxy and is sent to the
directory service as a query.
7. The directory service receives the query, resolves the group member (based on the
mapping that was inserted in step #4), and forwards the encapsulated anycast
packet to the group member. Because no caching is employed, there is no need
to return the query results to the anycast proxy. Figure 3.9 shows the contents of
the arriving and departing packets.
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Incoming packet:
To: directoryService
From: proxy2
Data: Query for sessionID
Deliver on resolution:
To: client
From: group
Data: TCP ACK
arrived at proxy proxy2
Outgoing packet:
To: member
From: directoryService
Data: To: client
From: group
Data: TCP ACK
arrived at proxy proxy2
Figure 3.9: Packet contents for TCP example session (without caching), step
#7: The directory service query is processed and the ACK packet relayed to the
group member.
8. The group member’s Stateful Anycast software receives the encapsulated packet,
records that the anycast packet came in via proxy #2, unwraps the ACK packet,
and passes the unwrapped packet to the kernel networking subsystem via the
virtual network interface. This step is identical to step #2.
9. This particular outgoing packet is delivered via proxy #2 because the last incoming
session packet came in via proxy #2.
3.3.1 Example with Caching
Without caching, the anycast proxies never deliver packets directly to the group mem-
bers because they never know which group member should receive a particular stateful
packet. Instead, incoming packets are always handed off to the directory service for
delivery. Not only could this slow down Stateful Anycast, this could potentially expose
the directory service to various types of DDoS attacks. The following is an example
of Stateful Anycast with caching. Figure 3.10 illustrates the packet exchange when
caching is involved. Several key differences in the way packets are processed exist be-
tween the non-caching and caching version of Stateful Anycast. The circled numbers
identify interesting packet processing steps and correspond to the following descriptions:
1. Sending the SYN/ACK is almost the same as in the non-caching version of Stateful
Anycast. The only difference is that the encapsulated packet is accompanied by
caching information to minimize the need to query the directory service. Note that
a directory service mapping is still inserted in case the client’s second packet—the
ACK packet—arrives at a different proxy. Figure 3.11 shows the contents of the
arriving and departing packets.
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SYN
SYN
SYN/ACK
SYN/ACK
ACK
encap(ACK)
ACK
encap(DATA)
DATA
Stateful Anycast
Proxy #1
Stateful Anycast
Proxy #2
ACK
ACK
encap(ACK)result
encap(ACK)
query+
encap(SYN/ACK)
insert+
encap(SYN/ACK)
update
OK
DATA
encap(DATA)
DATA
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5
3
DATA
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Directory
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Member Mgmt
Software
Group Member
Server
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Listen
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Established
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(handshake complete)
(ACK omitted)
Figure 3.10: TCP three-way handshake with a caching version of Stateful Any-
cast. In this example, the receiving anycast proxy changes between the sender’s
second and third packets. The directory service is queried only when a packet
arrives at a different anycast proxy. Compare with figure 3.2.
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Incoming packet:
To: client
From: group
Data: TCP SYN/ACK
Outgoing packet:
To: directoryService
From: member
Data: Map sessionID to member,
entry lifetime = 10 seconds,
cache lifetime the shorter of:
10 seconds or 10 packets.
Deliver the following to proxy1
along with caching info:
To: client
From: group
Data: TCP SYN/ACK
Figure 3.11: Packet contents for TCP example session (with caching), step #1:
The encapsulated TCP SYN/ACK is accompanied by mapping instructions for
the directory service as well as caching information for the proxy to help it avoid
the need to query the directory service. Compare with figure 3.5.
2. The proxy receives the encapsulated packet from the directory service, inserts the
mapping into its cache, and forwards the SYN/ACK to the client. Figure 3.12
shows the contents of the arriving and departing packets.
Incoming packet:
To: proxy1
From: directoryService
Data: Cache sessionID to member,
lifetime the shorter of:
10 seconds or 10 packets.
Deliver the following packet:
To: client
From: group
Data: TCP SYN/ACK
Outgoing packet:
To: client
From: group
Data: TCP SYN/ACK
Figure 3.12: Packet contents for TCP example session (with caching), step #2:
The incoming encapsulated packet is accompanied by cache instructions to help
the proxy deliver future packets without needing to query the directory service.
3. The proxy receives the ACK from the client, recognizes the packet as part of a
stateful session, extracts the session ID, and looks up the session ID in its cache.
Because the cache contains the mapping, the proxy can encapsulate and forward
the packet directly to the group member.
4. The group member includes cache refresh instructions with the outgoing data
packet. The group member also separately refreshes the directory service mapping
in case future packets arrive via a different proxy.
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5. With caching, it is useful to return the directory service lookup results to the
proxy. Along with the session ID to group member mapping, the results contain
information on how long the mapping should be cached at the proxy (set by the
group member in step #1).
6. The proxy caches the results such that all future packets can be delivered directly
to the group member.
3.4 Deploying the Stateful Anycast Service
Deploying Stateful Anycast is similar to deploying PIAS (see section 2.3). First, the
operator of the Stateful Anycast service acquires a block of IP addresses to advertise
via BGP. Each Stateful Anycast group will be assigned one or more of the IP addresses
from the block. The group of proxies themselves should be assigned one of the addresses
from the block to make it easier for a group member to find its closest proxy. Next,
the anycast service operator deploys the anycast proxies. As anycast proxies are also
normal IP anycast group members, deployment is identical to deploying an IP anycast
group (see section 2.2). Next, the Stateful Anycast software is deployed on the proxies.
This software contains the basic processing rules (see section 3.6) as well as software
that implements a distributed directory service for resolving session identifiers to their
corresponding group members (see section 3.10).
Multiple proxies should be deployed at each attachment point to maximize service
availability. For more information, see the discussion on the limitations of IP anycast
in section 2.2.
3.5 Deploying an Anycast Group
To add a new group, the anycast service provider assigns the group one or more IP
addresses. The group operator deploys its group members as it sees fit. For optimal
performance, the group members should be placed at strategic locations just like normal
IP anycast group members would. However, placing Stateful Anycast group members
is much easier than placing normal IP anycast group members. Stateful Anycast group
members need only be a simple host with a simple connection to the Internet because
packets arrive and leave using unicast. The group members can even reside behind a
NAT [22] box without affecting the services provided by the group member—as long as
the proxy to group member tunneling protocol is NAT-traversable.
A group operator can deploy as many group members as it sees fit. The number
of group members is independent of the number of anycast proxies. A group operator
could choose to deploy only a single group member in order to take advantage of the
filtering and session revocation capabilities of the anycast proxies. Or the operator could
deploy many more group members than proxies, which might be necessary if the group
members have low bandwidth connections or are computationally limited.
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For extra flexibility, the group operator could choose to implement its own di-
rectory service. The anycast proxies would then query the group’s directory service in
order to route packets. Or, the group could also choose to have the proxies treat all
packets as stateless. This could be used to implement a scalable multihoming solution
by configuring each group member to oﬄoad incoming packets to a local network.
Group members run special software that performs many tasks. For one, it au-
thenticates the group member to the anycast proxies to prevent unauthorized hosts from
intercepting incoming traffic and sourcing outgoing traffic. It also provides the tunnel
end-point for unwrapping incoming packets and wrapping outgoing packets. Finally, it
provides management functions such as the propagation of workload information.
3.6 Packet Processing Algorithms
This section describes the procedures for processing packets as they travel from source
hosts to the group members. It also describes the reverse path—what happens when a
group member sends a reply packet back to the host.
3.6.1 Delivering Packets to the Anycast Proxies
IP anycast is used to route packets to the anycast proxies. Clients address packets to the
anycast group’s IP address and the Internet’s existing routing infrastructure forwards
them to the anycast proxies. Clients need no special modification or software—they
simply treat the anycast group as if it was a normal Internet host.
Anycast proxies must be configured to listen for and accept packets destined to
the whole block of advertised IP addresses and then pass the packets to the Stateful
Anycast proxy software. How this is implemented depends on the lower-layer networking
technology used and the design of the networking subsystem of the proxy’s operating
system. An implementation using Ethernet and packet capture libraries is described in
section 5.3.2.
3.6.2 Processing Packets at the Anycast Proxies
When a packet arrives at an anycast proxy, the proxy must determine which group
member should receive the packet. This process requires a handful of steps. Several of
the steps are only briefly explained here; full details can be found by following references
to the appropriate section.
1. Identify the group that will receive the packet. Each group is assigned an address,
so the anycast proxy only needs to examine the destination address in order to
discover which group should receive the packet.
2. Fetch and process the group’s configuration details. Each group might choose
different features, which may or may not relate to the core functionality of Stateful
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Anycast. For example, a group could choose to turn off support for stateful
sessions and have only basic anycast service. (If the group does not want support
for stateful sessions, the proxy skips to step #7.) Or, a group may desire the
proxies to enforce specific packet filter rules, as is done in Firebreak [25].
3. Determine whether the packet is part of a stateful session (see section 3.7).
4. For packets belonging to a stateless session, pick any group member (see section
3.8) and jump to step #7.
5. For packets that are part of a stateful session, extract the session ID from the
packet (see section 3.9).
6. Check the local session ID resolution cache to see if the session ID is known to the
proxy. If it is, decrement the entry lifetime counter. (See section 3.10.)
7. Encapsulate the anycast packet: concatenate the packet with metadata (including
the unicast address of the anycast proxy that received the packet) and session ID
(if the packet is part of a session). See section 3.11 for more details.
8. If the particular group member recipient is unknown, pass the encapsulated packet
to the group-specific directory service as a query (see section 3.10). The direc-
tory service takes responsibility for delivering the packet to the appropriate group
member and returns the resolution result to the originating anycast proxy to be
cached.
Otherwise, send the encapsulated packet directly to the group member.
3.6.3 Receiving Packets at the Group Member
Group members run software that listens for the incoming encapsulated packets. Once
an encapsulated packet comes in, the software processes any metadata accompanying
the encapsulated packet (see section 3.11), unwraps the packet, and hands the packet
to the appropriate network application process for further processing.
One particular piece of metadata—the address of the anycast proxy that originally
received the incoming anycast packet—is recorded to enable reply packets to be sent
through the same anycast proxy that received the incoming packet. While this is not
strictly required for correct operation, using the same proxy for reply packets has several
benefits, discussed in the following section.
How the packet is handed to the appropriate network application process depends
on the design of the application software. Section 5.2 discusses an implementation that
provides backwards compatibility with legacy networking application software.
3.6.4 Sending Reply Packets
Outbound packets follow the reverse path (with an exception for packets that go through
the directory service—see the insert() functions in section 3.10.1). Once the outbound
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packet is handed to the group member software, the software encapsulates the outbound
packet and its accompanying metadata inside a packet addressed to an anycast proxy.
Outbound packets are sent back through a proxy for two reasons: to bypass ingress
filters [23] and to efficiently send instructions and feedback to the proxies.
While the group member can send the encapsulated outbound packet to any proxy,
group members should choose the remote host’s local anycast proxy for sending out-
bound packets. The biggest reason is to pre-cache the anycast proxy with the session’s
mapping in order to eliminate the need to query the directory service. Another reason
is routing efficiency (the remote host’s proxy is close to the remote host). Finding the
remote host’s local proxy is done by noting which proxy received the remote host’s latest
incoming packet.
Once the encapsulated packet arrives at the proxy, the proxy processes the meta-
data and sends the outbound packet. The network’s routing infrastructure then delivers
the outbound packet to the destination.
3.6.5 Reacting to Attacks
Stateful Anycast proxies make no attempt to detect attacks. A proxy’s job is to simply
forward packets as fast as possible, not to analyze the sender’s intent. Instead, the
anycast proxies rely on the group members to detect whether a particular session has
become malicious.
Once a group member has determined that a session is malicious, it can revoke
the session by contacting the directory service and mapping the session ID to a special
value that instructs Stateful Anycast to drop the packet. This new mapping will affect
proxies that do not have a mapping to the victim group member cached. Any proxies
that still have a cache entry that maps the session ID to the victim will continue to
forward malicious packets until the cache entry expires or the proxy is contacted by the
victim group member and instructed to change the cache entry destination to “drop”.
Session revocation assumes that the group member is able to contact the directory
service and proxies while under attack. If it is not able to send outgoing packets, possible
actions are to use an out-of-band communication mechanism, wait for the directory
service mapping to expire, or rely on a dead-man switch—a monitoring service that
withdraws all of the victim host’s directory service mappings once it detects that the
victim host is no longer responding to status queries.
The process receiving the packets on the group member machine is in the best
position to gauge whether a session has become malicious. It has the most information
about the remote peer’s behavior and how well it matches appropriate or expected
behavior. However, the group member software may also have useful information about
packets that is not be passed to the receiving process. For example, the group member
software knows which proxy received each packet, but this information is not passed
on if the receiving process is a legacy software application. Packets belonging to the
same session that arrive via many different proxies may indicate a distributed attack
on the group member. Collecting valuable information from all possible sources and
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deciding whether a session has turned malicious would likely be the most difficult task
when deploying a DDoS-resistant anycasted service.
3.7 Determining Whether a Packet is Part of a Stateful
Session
For an anycast proxy to determine whether a packet is part of a stateful session, the
proxy must have a partial understanding of the syntax and semantics of the protocols
used by the groups it supports. Thanks to the IETF’s publicly-accessible RFCs, this
is a simple matter for most protocols. For example, TCP [61], the ubiquitous Internet
transport protocol, is connection oriented and therefore stateful. Any IP packet with a
value of 6 in the “Protocol” field [60] is a TCP packet and therefore known to be part
of a stateful protocol (with an exception; see the next paragraph). User Datagram Pro-
tocol (UDP) [58], another common transport protocol, is connectionless and therefore
not inherently stateful. However, stateful higher-layer protocols, such as multimedia
streaming protocols, may use UDP as a foundation. Thus, the proxy must examine the
UDP payload to discover whether the packet is part of a higher-layer stateful protocol
session.
Packets belonging to a bootstrapping stateful protocol, such as TCP SYN pack-
ets, are treated as belonging to a stateless protocol. Any group member can receive
these packets without disrupting the protocol’s operation because no state has been
established in a group member (yet).
Session statefulness can be relative to the role in a packet exchange. A session
could be stateful to both participants, or to only one participant. A session is stateful
to a participant if the participant must keep state between messages to ensure correct
operation. TCP is stateful to both participants because both ends must keep track
of the state of the connection. A DNS [46, 47] lookup is stateful to the query issuer
because the issuer waits for a response to its query packet. From the perspective of
the responder, the DNS lookup session is stateless because there is nothing about the
session that needs to be remembered after the reply packet has been sent. Therefore,
proxies need to be aware of the role being taken by the group member in addition to
the nature of the protocol embodied in a packet. Throughout this document, a session
is considered to be stateful when it is stateful from the perspective of a group member.
The information needed to determine whether a packet is part of a stateful protocol
is not always available to the anycast proxy. For example, encryption can completely
obscure the contents of a packet. IPsec [35] can hide everything except for the encrypting
host’s IP address, the group’s anycast IP address, and the fact that the payload is an
IPsec-encrypted packet. As another example, a protocol may rely on historical context
to interpret a packet’s data. In other words, the contents of a previously sent packet
may be needed to extract a session ID, and the two packets might not arrive at the
same anycast proxy.
If an anycast proxy is unable to determine whether the packet is part of a stateful
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protocol, the proxy could either treat the packet as belonging to a stateless protocol and
simply deliver to any group member, or use the limited information it has to attempt
to identify the stateholder (see section 3.9). The choice can be hard-coded or expressed
in group configuration information. Ideally, groups will choose to use only protocols
that expose the relevant information to the anycast proxies in every packet, making this
issue irrelevant.
3.8 Choosing a Recipient Group Member for Non-Stateful
Packets
For packets that either belong to a non-stateful session or to a bootstrapping stateful
session, anycast proxies can arbitrarily choose any group member. Choosing a group
member based on a metric such as topological closeness, latency, or workload may
result in a significant performance improvement from the perspective of the remote
host. An appropriate algorithm for choosing a group member depends highly on local
circumstances, such as the anycast group size, group membership dynamics, availability
of network and group member performance measurement algorithms, the needs of the
group, and so on. The choice of group member selection algorithm does not need to
apply to every group; each group can use a different algorithm.
Akamai has effectively solved the problem of assigning an arbitrary client to a
“good” server in a scalable way. Algorithms similar to those employed by Akamai can
provide scalable group member assignments that result in good performance as seen by
remote users—perhaps even better than unicast thanks to proximity to the user.
A simple way to choose a group member is to randomly choose from the group
members that are in the anycast proxy’s catchment. Proxies can become aware of the
group members in their catchments by asking the group members to periodically connect
to the anycast IP address reserved for the group of proxies. Extra mechanisms would
be required to handle the cases of no group members in a catchment and a non-even
distribution of group members among the proxies. This approach can be extremely
effective if the group members are collocated with the anycast proxies.
There may be a significant advantage in choosing an algorithm that consistently
routes packets from a particular source to a particular group member. This consistency
can aid in providing proper behavior when proxies are unable to definitively identify
the proper recipient of an incoming packet due to a failure in the directory service or
the inability to extract a session identifier from a packet.
3.9 Session Identifiers
Session identifiers are the focal point of Stateful Anycast’s support for stateful sessions.
Stateful Anycast requires that every packet contain a globally-unique session identifier.
This section discusses the reasons for choosing session IDs and how they are extracted
from packets.
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3.9.1 Motivation for using session IDs
For packets that are part of a stateful session, anycast proxies must determine which
group member is holding the session’s state. To do this, the packet must contain in-
formation that somehow indicates the identity of the group member. There are two
possible ways to do this: (1) require the sender to embed a group member identifier in-
side every stateful packet, or (2) require the sender to embed a session identifier inside
every stateful packet and then use the session identifier to determine the group member.
Having an embedded group member indicator in every packet allows the anycast
proxies to quickly determine which group member should receive the packet. All the
proxies would need to do is extract the group member indicator, look up the unicast
IP address of the corresponding group member, and forward the packet. Unfortunately,
most protocols do not have an effective way to embed this information. In addition, re-
quiring an embedded group member indicator would require a change in sender software,
which is contrary to objective #4 (easy deployability). While this is only a secondary
objective, there is a more significant problem: Stateful Anycast would not meet design
objective #2 (DDoS mitigation). If the indicator was the only piece of information used
by the anycast proxies to determine the recipient group member, a malicious session
could not be revoked because there is no way to distinguish between different sessions
at the proxy. Essentially, the group member indicator would be an irrevocable handle
on a particular group member.
Instead of embedding a group member indicator inside every packet, Stateful Any-
cast requires some sort of session identifier to be embedded in every incoming packet.
Fortunately, this information is already present in most stateful protocol packets, elimi-
nating the need to require sender software or protocol modification. In order to support
multiple concurrent sessions between hosts, protocols typically embed some information
in every packet that helps the receiving host demultiplex the various sessions. This infor-
mation, when combined with data from the lower-layer protocols such as IP addresses,
yields a globally unique session identifier. For example, TCP uses a combination of
source IP address, destination IP address, source port, and destination port to uniquely
identify the session a particular TCP packet is in. This set of data is globally unique per
session, as no two peers will use the same source and destination port pair for distinct
sessions. UDP also has source and destination port fields, which are typically used in a
manner similar to TCP ports (packets belonging to the same session will have matching
IP addresses and ports).
3.9.2 Extracting the session ID
For many protocols in use on the Internet, extracting the session identifier is straight-
forward. Most sessions are contained inside a single TCP session, and TCP exposes the
session identifier in the form of the following tuple: {client IP address, client TCP port,
server IP address, server TCP port}. Protocols that use UDP usually follow the same
convention: packets belonging to the same session all have the same client and server IP
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addresses and port numbers. Protocols with randomly generated session identifiers or
randomly generated per-session host identifiers are ideally suited for Stateful Anycast,
assuming the identifiers are exposed in every packet. Such identifiers are present in i3
in the form of private triggers and may be present in future host identity or mobility
protocols.
It may not always be possible to extract the session identifier from a stateful
packet. Three possible causes are encryption, aggregating multiple lower-layer sessions
into a single higher-layer session, and sessions that are identified using context not
available in the packet.
Encryption can prevent a proxy from extracting a session identifier if the session
identifier is part of the encrypted data. For groups that require the use of protocols
that encrypt the session identifier, the decryption keys must be shared with the anycast
proxies.
A high-level session composed of multiple low-level sessions can also prevent a
proxy from directing packets to the right group member. As an example, imagine an
anycasted web server for a retail business. Rather than storing the user’s shopping cart
data in a user-held cookie or specially formed URL, the storefront software stores the
user’s shopping cart data in the web server. To participate in the session, the user sends
an identifier (such as a username) to the server with every HTTP query. The server uses
the identifier to fetch the session state. Because each HTTP query can use a different
TCP session, the anycast proxies must be able to direct all of the component TCP
sessions to the same web server. Unfortunately, a higher-layer session identifier can not
be included in a TCP SYN packet, making this task impossible. While it is easy to
work around this particular problem by using cookies, specially formed URLs, and/or
a common database shared among all group members, it illustrates how higher-layer
sessions that use multiple lower-layer sessions can be difficult to support.
A session might only be identifiable with information not present in the received
packet. The required information might only be available in a previously-sent packet or
some other historical context unavailable to the proxy.
3.10 Session Identifier Directory Service
The directory service is responsible for matching a session identifier to the group member
holding the session. Mappings between a session identifier and a group member are
stored in the directory service and are queried by proxies to determine which group
member should receive a particular stateful packet.
3.10.1 Directory Service Functions
The directory service exports several functions to the anycast proxies and group mem-
bers. There are three basic functions: query, insert, and remove.
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Query Functions
There are three query function variations, each of which has advantages and disadvan-
tages. The following are descriptions of the directory service query functions:
 result ← query(sessionID) instructs the directory service to find a stateholder
mapping for the session identified by sessionID. The results are delivered back to
the querying host, which uses the results to deliver an incoming anycast packet.
See figure 3.13 for an illustration of the process.
packet
Stateful Anycast
Proxy
query
result
encap(packet)
packet
Client
Directory
Service
Member Mgmt
Software
Group Member
Server
Software
Figure 3.13: Directory service query and packet delivery using query().
If there is no mapping associated with the session identifier, the directory
service returns a configurable (per-group) default destination in the results. This
destination could be a special value that instructs the anycast proxies to drop the
packet or treat it as if it was part of a stateless protocol. This returned result is
cached just like a successful query result.
Advantages of this function (relative to the other two query functions): (1)
If multiple same-session packets arrive at the proxy, only one query needs to be
issued for the collection of packets. (2) The collection of packets can be delivered
in the order they arrived at the anycast proxy. (3) The query’s packet size is
small, minimizing the burden on the directory service.
Disadvantages of this function: (1) anycast proxies must queue incoming
packets as they wait for replies from the directory service. (2) Waiting for a reply
from the directory service can increase packet delay. Asking the directory service
to deliver the packet once the query is resolved can improve performance.
 result ← queryAndForward(sessionID, packet) instructs the directory service
to find a mapping for the session identified by sessionID and forward the packet
packet to the group member identified in the mapping. The results are returned
to the query issuer to be cached. This is the query method used in the TCP
examples in section 3.3. See figure 3.14 for an illustration of the process.
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Figure 3.14: Directory service query and packet delivery using queryAndFor-
ward().
Advantages of this function: (1) Anycast proxies do not need to queue pack-
ets as they wait for query results. (2) An individual packet’s delay is minimized
as the packet is forwarded the instant the destination host is discovered.
Disadvantages of this function if an anycast proxy does not wish to queue
packets: (1) Packets sent to the directory service are large, imposing an increased
burden on the directory service infrastructure. (2) When multiple packets for the
same session arrive before the first query results return, the same session ID query
is issued multiple times. This repeated work can be a significant problem if each
directory service query is burdensome on the infrastructure. (3) The combined
delay of all of the incoming packets can be high, especially if the directory ser-
vice takes a significant amount of time in processing a query. To minimize delay,
it would be better to queue the incoming packets that arrive shortly before the
session ID query results are returned. (4) This method can result in significant
out-of-order packet delivery, especially if directory service queries take a long time
to return. If a burst of an unknown session’s packets suddenly arrives at an any-
cast proxy, many of the packets that are sent through the directory service can
be delivered to the group member after packets that arrive at the anycast proxy
shortly after the query results are returned. Figure 3.15 shows an illustration.
The number of out-of-order packets depends on the incoming packet rate and the
relative difference between the time it takes to route packets through the direc-
tory service and the time it takes to send packets directly to the group member.
While the Internet’s best effort delivery makes no promises about in-order packet
delivery, significant out-of-order delivery can disrupt protocols such as TCP.
Problems that arise with this method may be reduced by queueing packets
at the anycast proxies.
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Figure 3.15: Out-of-order packet delivery with queryAndForward(). Each of
the three packets belongs to the same session. Because the directory service
takes a long time to process a query, a packet that arrives at the proxy right
after results are returned is delivered to the group member before a packet that
arrives at the proxy just before the results are returned.
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 (result, packet) ← queryAndReturn(sessionID, packet) instructs the directory
service to find a mapping for the session identified by sessionID and return the
packet packet to the anycast proxy along with the results. See figure 3.16 for an
illustration of the process. This is a compromise between the above two meth-
ods: queries are returned to the anycast proxy before the packet is sent to the
group member to minimize out-of-order delivery, and the packets are passed to
the directory service to eliminate the need to queue packets at anycast proxies.
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Figure 3.16: Directory service query and packet delivery using queryAndRe-
turn().
Advantages of this function: (1) Anycast proxies do not need to queue pack-
ets as they wait for query results. (2) Because the anycast proxies receive the query
results before forwarding any packets, packets are more likely to be delivered in
order.
Disadvantages of this function: The first three disadvantages are the same
as in queryAndForward(): (1) Packets sent to the directory service are large,
imposing an increased burden on the directory service infrastructure. (2) When
multiple packets for the same session arrive before the first query results return,
the same session ID query is issued multiple times. This repeated work can be a
significant problem if each directory service query is burdensome on the infrastruc-
ture. (3) The combined delay of all of the incoming packets can be high, especially
if the directory service takes a significant amount of time in processing a query.
To minimize delay, it would be better to queue the incoming packets that arrive
shortly before the session ID query results are returned. (4) This method can still
result in out-of-order packet delivery if repeated queries for the same session ID
take a different amounts of time to process. See figure 3.17 for an illustration. The
likelihood of this happening depends on how the directory service is implemented.
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Figure 3.17: Out-of-order packet delivery with queryAndReturn(). Both
packets belong to the same session. Because the directory service takes a longer
time to process the first query than the second, the second packet is delivered
to the group member first.
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The appropriate circumstances to use each method is left to future experimentation.
Directory service and anycast proxy software can easily support all three methods,
making experimentation easy.
Insert Functions
There are also three insert function variations, similar to the three query function vari-
ations. The following are descriptions of the directory service insert functions:
 status ← insert(sessionID, groupMember, mappingLifetime, cacheLifetime) in-
structs the directory service to insert a mapping between sessionID and group-
Member with mapping entry lifetime settings as specified in mappingLifetime and
cache lifetime settings as specified in cacheLifetime. When the mapping has been
inserted, a success or failure code is returned. If a mapping already exists for
the session ID, the mapping is replaced, allowing insert() to be used to update
existing mappings.
This function is used by the group members when a session has been estab-
lished. Outgoing packets that evoke a response must wait for a successful directory
service mapping insertion or else the reply packet may reach the directory service
before the mapping has been inserted, resulting in a failed lookup. Thus, just as
in query(), this method requires the group member software to queue outbound
packets that would evoke a response in the remote host until the insertion op-
eration returns successfully. However, queueing is not likely to pose a problem
because the number of outbound packets at the beginning of a session is usually
small, especially for congestion-controlled transport protocols.
 status ← insertAndForward(sessionID, groupMember, mappingLifetime, cache-
Lifetime, packet, proxy) is similar to insert(), but also instructs the directory
service to forward packet to proxy when the mapping has been inserted.
This function may provide lower packet delay over insert() and it does not
require packet queueing. However, just as with queryAndForward(), multiple
outbound packets may result in excess directory service work and out-of-order
packet delivery. However, a directory service insert of this sort is likely to take
place only after the start of a session, and congestion-controlled transport proto-
cols such as TCP will not have many packets to send at first.
 (status, packet) ← insertAndReturn(sessionID, groupMember, mappingLife-
time, cacheLifetime, packet) is similar to insert(), but also instructs the directory
service to return packet along with the success or failure code.
This function is a compromise between insert() and insertAndForward().
With this function, group members can insert a directory service mapping without
queueing outgoing packets and while minimizing the probability of out-of-order
packet delivery. Because the number of outgoing packets is typically not high
at the start of a session, insertAndForward() will likely be favored over this
function due to this function’s greater packet delay.
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Remove Function
Finally, there is one remove function:
 status ← remove(sessionID) instructs the directory service to remove the map-
ping for the session identified by sessionID and return a success or failure code.
If there is no mapping with that session identifier, the directory service simply
returns a success code.
This function can be invoked when a session has completed or when a group
member wishes to revoke a session.
3.10.2 Directory Service Mapping Data Structure
A directory service mapping has four basic parts: the session identifier being mapped,
the destination group member, when the mapping should expire, and how long a map-
ping should be cached in an anycast proxy.
The destination group member field usually contains the unicast address of the
group member, but it can also hold special values to indicate alternate processing. One
special value instructs proxies to simply drop packets that are a part of the session. This
value is employed when a group member wishes to have a session negatively cached at
the proxies, perhaps because the session has become malicious. Another special value
instructs proxies to treat packets belonging to the session as stateless.
The directory service mapping lifetime field is an expiration date on the mapping.
This value is used only by the directory service to purge stale mappings. This expiration
date provides two benefits. First, it keeps the directory service clear of stale mappings
that group members might fail to remove. Second, it provides an automated session
revocation mechanism in case a group member is unable to remove the mapping due
to an attack. It is therefore important to keep the lifetime as short as possible without
requiring an impractical number of directory service updates to extend the lifetime.
The cache lifetime information tells a proxy how long it should cache the results
of a directory service query. There are two parts to the cache lifetime: a byte limit and
a time limit. These two are explained below.
Figure 3.18 shows an sample mapping entry.
Session ID: sessionID
Group Member: groupMemberIP
Mapping Expiration: May 28, 2007
at 14:00:00 EDT
Cache Lifetime: The shorter of:
10 seconds or 1× 106 bytes
Figure 3.18: Sample directory service mapping.
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3.10.3 Caching Directory Service Query Results
Caching is a critical part of Stateful Anycast. Caching improves performance by giving
anycast proxies the ability to route packets directly to the recipient group member.
Packet delays and network load can be significantly reduced by avoiding multi-hop
treks through an overlay network.
More importantly, caching can protect the directory service from DDoS attacks
by reducing the service’s workload while under attack. For example, without caching,
a flood of packets with the same session identifier will cause multiple identical lookups.
If lookups for the same session are handled by the same directory service node, the
packet flood may disable the directory service node. If that directory service node is
also an anycast proxy, hosts in that anycast proxy’s catchment will be unable to reach
any anycast groups. With caching, the directory service’s workload is reduced to an
occasional lookup per anycast proxy. For more discussion on possible DDoS attacks on
the directory service, see section 4.2.
Cache lifetime is controlled by two variables. The first is a time limit that in-
dicates the maximum amount of time a cache entry should be considered valid. This
guarantees a level of freshness and, like the directory service mapping lifetime, provides
an automatic revocation mechanism in case the group member is somehow unable to
instruct the anycast proxy to void the cache entry. The second cache lifetime variable
is a byte limit that indicates the number of bytes that can be received before the cache
entry is considered invalid. Each time a session packet arrives at an anycast proxy, the
byte limit stored in the cache entry is decremented by the size of the packet. Once this
count reaches zero, future incoming packets are dropped. Together, the cache expiration
time and byte limit allow the group member to enforce a per-proxy bandwidth limit.
If there are many anycast proxies, a distributed attacker can stay below the per-
proxy bandwidth limit and still source a substantial amount of traffic. To combat this,
group members can take advantage of the fact that a valid session’s traffic will typically
enter through only one proxy thanks to the stability of BGP routes on the Internet. A
group member can have a very limited cache lifetime in its directory service mapping but
give the proxy used by the session an extended lifetime by directly sending cache updates
to the proxy. These updates can either have a long lifetime and be sent occasionally or
have a short lifetime and be sent frequently to keep the byte count from reaching zero.
The updates can be piggybacked on outgoing packets to keep the overhead down. If the
session turns malicious and tries to flood the group member from distributed sources,
the traffic from other proxies will be very limited. If the session stays legitimate but
the session traffic shifts to an alternate proxy, the session may be forced to slow down
until the group member can update the new proxy’s cache.
When a proxy’s cache is full, it must start replacing cache entries. Proxies should
implement a cache replacement algorithm that minimizes the amount of directory service
queries. Sessions with a low packet rate should be purged first. With potentially
malicious sessions, calculating the expected packet rate is not easy. An attacker could
either source more packets than expected or attempt to fill the cache with rarely used
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cache entries to force legitimate sessions to invoke frequent directory service lookups.
To prevent such attacks, proxies should base expected packet rate on recent history and
discount new session entries.
Caching is helpful only when packets belonging to the same session are likely to
arrive at the same small set of proxies. If each packet of a session arrives at a different
proxy, caching provides no benefit. On the Internet, BGP route stability ensures that
packets will arrive at the same proxy unless there is some dynamic event such as remote
host movement or a link failure. Because of this stability, caching is likely to be very
effective on the Internet.
3.10.4 Managing Directory Service Entries
Inserting, updating, and removing directory service mappings is the responsibility of
the group members. This frees the proxies from tracking session states and gives the
most control to the group members, making Stateful Anycast more in-line with the
end-to-end arguments [67].
Compared to the anycast proxies, group members have more session knowledge, so
giving group members the ability to set session mappings provides the greatest amount
of flexibility. For example, a session may be composed of multiple sub-sessions, and
only the group member may be aware of the association between the sub-sessions. Also,
with control over mapping in their hands, group members are able to migrate sessions to
other group members by transferring a session’s state and updating the corresponding
directory service mapping.
Group members should wait to insert a mapping until after the session is fully
established. Fully establishing a session usually requires at least one round trip. Waiting
for the round trip makes it harder for an attacker to establish a session using a spoofed
source address, which in turn makes it harder for the attacker to consume state in the
directory service.
3.10.5 Directory Service Implementation
So far, discussion about the directory service has been quite general, leaving implemen-
tation details largely unstated. However, the choice of directory service implementation
can significantly impact Stateful Anycast’s ability to mitigate DDoS attacks. Directory
service queries and mapping inserts are triggered by the actions of untrusted hosts, so
these functions must be resilient to DDoS attack.
To minimize vulnerability, the directory service is implemented on a structured
peer-to-peer overlay network. The mappings are stored in a distributed hash table
implemented by the overlay network. In some ways, the directory service is similar to
i3: mappings are like triggers in that they store indirection instructions, and packets
are routed through the directory service. However, there are a few key differences:
mappings have cache metadata not present in i3 triggers, and the contents of a mapping
are returned to a querying host to be cached.
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Each overlay node is responsible for a subset of the session identifier space. Map-
pings in a node’s subset are stored at the node, and queries are resolved at the node.
Each directory service message (which could be a query, an insert, or a remove) is
routed through the overlay network until it reaches the node responsible for the session
ID contained in the message. Repeated queries for the same session identifier will be
routed to the same node, so caching should be employed at anycast proxies to prevent
DDoS attacks on directory service nodes. In addition, a directory service node’s session
identifier subset should be kept secret to prevent an attacker from directing a large
collection of unique queries to the same node. This can be accomplished by passing
each session identifier through a secret one-way function and using the output as the
distributed hash table key.
The anycast proxies comprise the overlay network nodes. Because anycast proxies
are likely to be stable members of the overlay network, overhead from maintenance traffic
will be low even if the chosen routing algorithm results in high-degree nodes. Thus, it is
advantageous to choose a routing algorithm that minimizes network diameter because
this also minimizes the amount of work that must be done to resolve a query or to
insert, update, or remove a mapping. A simple routing algorithm is to configure each
overlay node to be aware of every other node such that queries or other messages can
be sent directly to the destination node in a single hop (O(n) degree, O(1) diameter).
3.11 Encapsulating Packets
Incoming anycast packets and outbound reply packets are passed between the group
members, directory service, and anycast proxies by taking the complete, unmodified
packet data and placing it in the payload of a unicast packet. The source IP address,
destination IP address, and all other IP headers of the original packet are left unmod-
ified. This encapsulation provides the greatest protocol support and does not require
the workarounds needed for network address translation [22]. Packet encapsulation is
also referred to as tunneling, where the host that encapsulates the packets and the host
that unwraps the encapsulated packets are the two ends of the tunnel.
Encapsulation also provides an easy way to include in-band metadata. This data
is included alongside the embedded packet. Figure 3.19 contains an illustration of an
encapsulated incoming TCP SYN packet.
The metadata can be anything that is helpful to the party receiving the encapsu-
lated packets. Helpful metadata might include:
 Cryptographic data. This can include a digital signature to ensure data integrity
and to verify packet authenticity or information needed to negotiate encryption
keys.
 A timestamp used to calculate the packet’s delay between the two ends of the
tunnel.
 A sequence number to identify packet loss between the two ends of the tunnel.
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To:  group
From:  client TCP SYN
Via:  Proxy #1To:  Group Member #1
From:  Proxy #1
IP headers
IP headers Payload
Encapsulated PacketMetadata
Payload
Figure 3.19: Illustration of an encapsulated incoming TCP SYN packet.
 Reverse-path performance information. Statistics regarding the delays and losses
experienced by packets sent from a proxy to a group member can be reflected back
to the proxy to help the proxy choose the best group member for new sessions.
 Incoming proxy identity. A group member needs to know which proxy received
an incoming anycast packet to help direct replies and to help identify distributed
attacks. This information is not in the encapsulating packet’s source address if
the packet is routed through the directory service.
 Cache information. A group member may wish to ask a proxy to change a cache
entry by extending the lifetime, altering the destination, purging the entry, and so
on. An anycast proxy may wish to inform a group member of hit/miss statistics
or a cache entry’s remaining lifetime.
 Group member workload information. A group member may wish to inform a
proxy of its current workload to help the proxy balance load among group mem-
bers. A proxy may wish to tell a group member about the average group workload
to help the group member identify whether its workload is unusually high.
 Acknowledgments of requested actions. Proxies should confirm requests to update
cache entries.
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Design Evaluation
This chapter discusses how well Stateful Anycast meets the design objectives outlined
in section 3.1.
4.1 Support for stateful sessions
Stateful Anycast provides remote users with a handle on a particular group member.
So long as group members use a supported protocol, Stateful Anycast guarantees best-
effort delivery to the proper stateholder. Delivery is not conditioned on route stability
as in normal anycast.
The support for stateful sessions does not need to be placed in the proxies. Match-
ing a packet to a group member could be the sole responsibility of the group. For ex-
ample, group members could run their own private directory service. Indeed, pushing
responsibility for stateful sessions to the group would be more in-line with the End-to-
End Arguments [67]. Because of this, a Stateful Anycast deployment should give groups
the option to handle stateful sessions on their own. However, there are at least three
reasons for implementing stateful support at the proxies. First, it simplifies the deploy-
ment of a new anycast group. Second, it allows for the efficient reuse of functionality.
Finally, it allows for unwanted traffic to be dropped earlier.
Some argue that regular IP anycast is good enough to support stateful sessions [38].
There is a large class of applications that are adequately served by IP anycast, namely
applications whose sessions are short-lived relative to topology changes or whose sessions
easily recover from a sudden loss of server-side state. Typical web browsing is one such
application. An HTTP page or image download happens relatively quickly compared
to the current rate of changes in routing or from mobility. In addition, most web
session state is stored in the web client in the form of cookies or specially-formed URLs.
Stateful Anycast is most suitable for applications with long-lived sessions that do not
easily recover from a sudden loss of server-side state. Such applications often have
real-time demands or require substantial server-side state. Examples include streaming
media and complex multiplayer games. As mobility, wireless communications, and
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advanced routing become more prevalent, applications will become increasingly long-
lived relative to topology changes, making stateful support important for a broader
range of applications.
4.2 DDoS Mitigation
Anycast diffuses DDoS attack traffic among multiple hosts, and IP anycast chooses the
destination hosts based on topological closeness. Attack traffic is therefore sunk early
rather than after a cross-network journey. This minimizes the work done by the network
during a DDoS attack.
Stateful Anycast adds to IP anycast by providing remote users a handle on a group
member. However, this allows malicious users to end-run anycast’s natural closest-
member diffusion. To counter this while still providing legitimate users with a handle
on a stateholder, Stateful Anycast allows group members to revoke a sender’s ability to
direct traffic to a specific host. Once a session is revoked, attack traffic reverts to being
diffused among distributed traffic sinks: the traffic is either dropped at the proxies or
processed at various group members. In essense, Stateful Anycast embeds authorization
for a specific destination inside the network.
However, Stateful Anycast depends on an attacker’s inability to get an irrevocable
handle on a group member or anycast proxy. Specifically, attackers must not be able
to determine the unicast IP addresses of proxies or group members. Once this infor-
mation is exposed, the proxy or group member is constantly at risk of attack. This is
arguably the weakest link in Stateful Anycast, as an attacker observing the unicast traf-
fic between proxies and group members could become a considerable threat. However,
unlike Akamai’s service and the mobile-IP–based anycast service proposed by Szyma-
niak, et al. [71], the Stateful Anycast design prevents the wholesale gathering of unicast
addresses.
There are two possible ways to mitigate an attack on an exposed proxy or group
member, neither of which is ideal. First, the exposed node could simply move to an
alternate attachment point. This is not an easy task, especially for a proxy. Depending
on how quickly an attacker can discover the new location, moving a proxy or group
member can easily escalate into a costly game of hide–and–seek. Alternatively, filters
can be deployed in the nearby routers. These filters would drop all traffic destined to
the exposed node’s unicast IP address except for Stateful Anycast traffic (encapsulated
packets, directory service queries, etc.). This method is most effective when the filter
rules are installed close to the traffic source, but that is not easy with a well-distributed
attacker. Distributing filters to nearby routers may be enough to substantially weaken
an attacker.
Besides discovering the unicast IP addresses, there are numerous other possible
attacks. The remainder of this section informally lists many of the interesting attacks
along with their possible defenses. The analysis assumes that Stateful Anycast is de-
ployed on a network with stable routes (such as the Internet) and that the directory
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service is implemented on a structured peer-to-peer overlay network. It also assumes
that the adversary is capable of forming arbitrary packets (including spoofing the source
address) and sending enough total traffic to saturate the links leading to a proxy or group
member. The attacker’s power is limited, however: the amount of traffic sourced in any
proxy’s catchment is not enough to significantly impact legitimate sessions even if all of
the catchment’s traffic is directed to a single group member node.
4.2.1 Attacks on group members
 Shared session ID
The attack: An attacker establishes a session with a group member. Once
the directory service mapping is added, the session identifier is shared with the
distributed malicious sources. The attacker then instructs the sources to flood the
group using packets containing the shared session ID.
Effects: All of the attack traffic is delivered to a single group member.
Defenses: The group member revokes the session by changing the mapping
destination to “drop” in the directory service and in anycast proxy caches.
Required capabilities: The victim must be able to detect that it is under
attack and be able to contact the directory service and proxies while under attack.
 Repeated shared session ID
The attack: An attacker repeatedly opens a new session, shares the session
ID, and instructs the distributed sources to flood using the session ID. The new
sessions are always started from the same node. The attacker attempts to start a
new session before the victim can react to the old session.
Effects: If the proxies consistently direct a given source’s new sessions to the
same group member, the victim may be continually subject to all of the attack
traffic. Even if a group member revokes the session being used to attack, the
attacker migrates to an alternate session ID.
Defenses: Proxies can assign new sessions based on workload to make sure
that a new session is not given to a group member that is under attack. In
addition, group members can refuse sessions from hosts that have attacked in the
recent past.
Required capabilities: The victim must be able to detect that it is under
attack and revoke sessions while under attack. To temporarily refuse sessions
from a source that has attacked in the recent past, the group member must be
able to determine that the new attack sessions are coming from the same source.
 Shared collection of session IDs
The attack: A single malicious source opens as many concurrent sessions as
possible. The source then gives each distributed attacker a different session ID to
flood.
Effects: If the anycast proxies consistently direct a given source’s new ses-
sions to the same group member, the group member will be flooded with all of the
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attack traffic. The amount of per-session traffic may be low, but the total amount
of traffic will be high.
Defenses: Once the victim detects that it is under attack, it identifies the
malicious sessions by examining the traffic per session initiator (rather than the
traffic per session). All of the sessions that were started by the same malicious
node are then revoked.
Required capabilities: The victim must be able to detect that it is under
attack and revoke sessions while under attack. It must also be able to identify
the true originator of a session. Identifying the originator may be difficult when
packets can be spoofed, but new sessions could require at least one round trip to
make it difficult for an attacker to start a session when spoofing.
4.2.2 Attacks on the directory service
 Random, bogus session IDs
The attack: Malicious senders source many small packets with random, bo-
gus session IDs.
Effects: Every packet becomes a query. If query-and-forward is used, the
query packets are larger than the incoming packets due to encapsulation and query
overhead. If the packets are small enough, the overhead could be relatively large
and become a significant load amplifier. For example, a 28-byte IPv4 UDP packet
becomes at least a 48-byte IPv4 packet (probably much larger). These query
packets are handed to the directory service peer-to-peer overlay network where
they are forwarded to various directory service nodes, many of which are likely to
be topologically distant. If the diameter of the directory service overlay network
is greater than one, the packets can end up bouncing back and forth across the
Internet. While the attack traffic is still diffused, the burden placed on the network
could be heavy enough to impair the directory service and cause some collateral
damage.
Defenses: It is particularly difficult to defend against this attack. Two
possible approaches:
1. The proxies could perform normal lookups rather than query-and-forward
lookups in an attempt to reduce traffic, but normal queries require substantial
overhead of their own in the form of reply packets, bringing their defensive
utility into question.
2. The directory service could temporarily increase mapping redundancy so that
proxies are less likely to require a query to a distant directory service node.
Increasing redundancy comes with a cost: extra traffic will be required to in-
sert, update, and remove the redundant mappings. Automated redundancy
tuning would be required to maintain the minimal directory service load un-
der varying attack loads. The effectiveness of increased redundancy depends
on the relative rate of directory service changes.
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Required capabilities: To automatically tune the mapping redundancy, di-
rectory service nodes would need to be able to gather load statistics, calculate the
replication sweet spot, and coordinate the change to a different level of replication.
 Rapid session setup
The attack: Malicious sources rapidly establish as many sessions as possible.
Effects: The bogus sessions consume directory service state.
Defenses: Sessions that never become active after they are established
should be terminated after a timeout period or when the group’s overall state
consumption is high. In addition, if the first several packets of a session are likely
to arrive at the same proxy (due to topology and routing stability), a group mem-
ber could consider delaying the insertion of a mapping into the directory service
until the session sees sufficient activity. At first, the mapping would only be in the
initial proxy’s cache, and the group member would rely on packets arriving at that
same proxy until the mapping is inserted into the directory service. This defense
mechanism would disrupt legitimate sessions if the legitimate sender’s packets
arrive at a different proxy early in the session.
While this attack seems straightforward to defend against, it is a significant
problem due to a security limitation in TCP. One incoming SYN packet is all
that is required to cause a TCP server to establish session state. This exposes
the server to a resource-consuming DoS attack via a SYN flood [21]. When only
a single packet is required to establish state, a flood of state-generating packets
can be created with minimal effort. In addition, the attacker’s location can be
masked by spoofed source addresses, making it difficult to filter the attack traffic.
In Stateful Anycast, each TCP SYN would also result in a directory service insert.
SYN cookies [18] were developed to prevent SYN flood attacks in direct
client-to-server TCP sessions. With SYN cookies, servers do not establish state
until the client echoes a server-generated cookie. This mechanism makes a success-
ful attack significantly more difficult to launch by requiring the attacker to expose
a return address and process three packets (two outbound and one inbound).
The additional processing slows down the attack while the exposed return address
makes it easier to filter malicious sources. Proxies can be made SYN cookie–aware
to prevent TCP SYN flood attacks in Stateful Anycast.
4.2.3 Attacks on the proxies
 DDoS the last hop before a proxy
The attack: The attacker discovers the unicast address of the last router
before an anycast proxy (by using the traceroute utility from a particular machine,
for example) and directs a flood of traffic to that address.
Effects: Links leading to the router are saturated with malicious traffic.
The nearby anycast proxy is rendered unreachable due to its proximity to the
unreachable router.
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Defenses: To help prevent an attacker from discovering the unicast addresses
of routers near anycast proxies, the routers should not send ICMP time exceeded
messages [59] in response to packets with a time-to-live field equal to zero. If a
unicast address of a router near a proxy is discovered, one recourse is to deploy
filters in all of the routers in the surrounding region. These filters would block all
traffic addressed to the victim router except for necessary management traffic.
Required capabilities: Deploying filters in routers requires filter support in
the routers, possible coordination with other network operators, and the ability
to distinguish valid management traffic from spoofed management traffic.
4.2.4 Other attacks
One class of attacks not mentioned above is insider attacks. Stateful Anycast assumes
a trusted relationship between the anycast proxies and the group members. While
the insider threat is important—especially considering the possibility of an attacker
compromising a group member and using it to collect information and launch attacks—
an analysis is not provided here.
Many other attacks not mentioned above can be easily thwarted through appro-
priate use of existing Stateful Anycast mechanisms. Some attacks, however, may require
additional mechanisms not provided by Stateful Anycast. Due to the anycast proxies’
advantageous location between the two communicating ends, as well as Stateful Any-
cast’s broad protocol support, many other defensive technologies can easily complement
Stateful Anycast.
4.3 Scalability
This section discusses how well Stateful Anycast would scale on a number of dimensions.
4.3.1 Scalability in the number of groups
Unlike IP anycast, Stateful Anycast can support a large number of anycast groups.
Stateful Anycast inherits this scalability from PIAS, which scales by moving the burden
of supporting multiple groups off of BGP routers and on to the anycast proxies where
they can be effectively managed.
The anycast proxies take the scaling burden off of the BGP routers by requiring
a single routing table entry for an arbitrary number of groups, assuming the proxies
only advertise a single block of IP addresses. No matter how many IP addresses are
in the advertised block, only one routing table entry is consumed. Routers only need
to know how to reach one anycast proxy in order to reach every group supported by
the anycast proxy. With regular IP anycast, routers must know paths to members from
every group—every group consumes a routing table entry.
While the proxies relieve the routing infrastructure from the burden of supporting
many groups, they must support the groups themselves. This is an easily dividable prob-
72
4.3. Scalability
lem because not all proxies need to know about every group (the groups are independent
of each other). The task of managing groups can be handled in a divide-and-conquer
manner by multiple physical machines, each capable of handling a subset. As the num-
ber of groups grows to exceed the management capabilities of an anycast proxy, the
anycast service operator adds another physical machine to each network attachment
point and reallocates group management responsibilities. The router connecting the
proxies to the rest of the Internet is then configured to forward incoming packets to the
relevant machines by entering static routes or by using a local routing protocol such as
OSPF [49].
As an example (illustrated in figure 4.1), suppose an anycast service provider
wishes to support 8192 groups occupying the IP address block 172.16.0.0/191. If a
physical anycast proxy machine is only capable of handling 5000 groups, two proxies
can be placed behind the attachment-point router. Proxy #1 would handle the 4096
groups in the block 172.16.0.0/20 (the lower half of 172.16.0.0/19) while proxy #2 would
handle the 4096 groups in the block 172.16.16.0/20 (the upper half of 172.16.0.0/19).
The router would direct only the packets destined to an address in 172.16.0.0/20 to
proxy #1 while packets destined to 172.16.16.0/20 would only go to proxy #2.
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Figure 4.1: Scaling Stateful Anycast to support a large number of groups. A
large block of IP addresses is advertised to the Internet but each proxy handles
a fraction.
Responsibility for groups does not have to be divided evenly; an anycast service
provider can arbitrarily divide the groups among the proxies (to give more groups to
newer hardware, for example).
The burden a group imposes on an anycast proxy may be reduced by increasing
the number of proxies that are responsible for the group. This is done by deploying
proxies at new network attachment points. The new proxies add additional catchments,
1172.16.0.0/19 refers to the block of IPv4 addresses that have the same first 19 bits as the IP
address 172.16.0.0 (172.16.0.0 through 172.16.31.255 inclusive). Because IPv4 addresses contain 32 bits,
the number of IP addresses in a /19 block is 232−19 = 213 = 8192. The 〈address〉/〈bits〉 notation is
called CIDR notation.
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which reduces the size of other catchments. Smaller catchments should result in fewer
sessions and less overall work for each proxy, allowing them to support more groups.
4.3.2 Scalability in the number of group members per group
If anycast proxies only forwarded packets belonging to established stateful sessions, they
would never need to maintain long-term state about the location and status of group
members. Instead, the directory service would inform the proxies about destination
group members on an as-needed basis. However, to forward stateless packets or packets
belonging to a bootstrapping stateful session, proxies must be aware of the location of
a good group member (where “good” is defined by operator-specified metrics such as
workload, latency, packet loss, topological closeness, available bandwidth, etc.). Thus,
each proxy must be made aware of at least one available group member in each group.
Determining which group members should be known to a particular anycast proxy
is an implementation choice. To provide the most information for choosing a good
group member, each proxy should be made aware of every group member. However,
this approach does not scale as the number of proxies and group members increases.
To manage large deployments, proxies should be made aware of a subset of the group
members. By manually configuring each group member to associate itself with specific
proxies, a group operator can manually tune application responsiveness and load distri-
bution. One automated method is to have each group member register with its closest
proxy (by using the group of proxies’ anycast address). This information could then be
shared with proxies in neighboring catchments to ensure that each proxy has a good
number of group members from which to choose. Sophisticated distributed algorithms
for automatically associating group members with proxies to maximize some desired
performance metric is a possible subject for future research.
If the desired group member–proxy assignment still results in too many group
members per proxy, the number of proxies must be increased. This can be done in the
two ways mentioned previously: add more proxies to busy attachment points and divide
responsibility for the groups among the proxies, or deploy proxies to new attachment
points.
4.3.3 Scalability in group membership dynamics
The load a group imposes on the proxies includes the work needed to associate or
disassociate group members with proxies as the group members come on-line or go off-
line. The more frequently the group membership changes, the greater the computational
and communications needs of the proxies. Frequent membership change thus reduces
the number of group members (and by extension the number of groups) that can be
supported by a proxy. The burden of frequent membership changes is managed in the
same way as too many groups or too many group members: add more proxies to busy
attachment points or install proxies at new attachment points.
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4.3.4 Scalability in the number of anycast proxies
BGP routers only need to be aware of a path to a single anycast proxy. While routers
may receive advertisements from multiple proxies, they can safely ignore the non-optimal
choices. Deploying a large number of anycast proxies on the Internet does not impose
any larger of a state-keeping or message-passing burden on the routers than a single
anycast proxy would.
However, because the directory service is implemented on the proxies, the struc-
tured peer-to-peer overlay used to create the directory service must be able to support
all of the proxies. Structured peer-to-peer overlay networks are capable of growing to
millions of nodes, but there is a trade-off. Minimizing the number of hops required to
reach other nodes requires each node to keep track of many other nodes. While the state
required to keep track of millions of nodes is modest with modern hardware, the traffic
required to update node adjacency state is substantial when nodes frequently join and
leave. If anycast proxies are designed for high availability, the join and leave frequency
should be very low. This would permit an overlay configuration that requires one or a
few hops to reach any other node and would increase the performance of the directory
service.
4.3.5 Scalability in the rate of change in anycast proxy availability
Unfortunately, Stateful Anycast does not handle frequent changes in anycast proxy
availability very well. A proxy going up or down has two effects: routes must be
recalculated and the directory service has to reallocate which nodes have responsibility
for which parts of the session ID space.
If an anycast proxy is added or removed, the routing infrastructure must recal-
culate routes. If there is only one proxy at an attachment point and its availability
changes, routers throughout the proxy’s catchment must recalculate paths. With BGP’s
slow convergence, frequent proxy availability changes can render groups unreachable an
unacceptable amount of the time. To minimize service disruption, care must be taken
to minimize downtime. One approach is to deploy multiple proxies at every attachment
point. If one of the proxies goes down or comes up, route calculation only occurs at the
attachment point’s router. The local route adjustment is nearly instantaneous and has
minimal impact on service availability.
Proxy availability also affects the directory service. Each time a proxy goes down
or comes up, responsibility for the directory service state must be reallocated among
the proxies. If the overlay is well-connected to minimize the number of hops required
to reach another node, proxy availability changes can result in significant management
traffic.
4.3.6 Scalability in the number of stateful sessions
Mappings for established stateful sessions must be stored in the directory service. For
good performance and to protect against DDoS attacks, the mappings should also be
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cached at anycast proxies. Since directory service nodes are also anycast proxies, this
means that each proxy stores about twice the number of mappings as the number
of sessions it supports. Supporting directory service data redundancy for failover or
performance reasons requires this number to be even higher.
If each proxy supports thousands of group members and each group member has
thousands of concurrent sessions, tens of millions to hundreds of millions of mappings
may need to be stored and managed at each anycast proxy. This state-keeping burden
requires carefully chosen data structures and a substantial amount of memory per proxy
in order to provide reasonable packet forwarding performance.
If the number of stateful sessions becomes too numerous for the proxies to manage,
there are at least three ways to relieve the burden. Two of the ways are the same as
handling too many groups or group members: add more proxies to busy attachment
points or install proxies at new attachment points. The additional proxies result in
fewer mappings per proxy.
The third approach is to move the directory service onto the group members
themselves. Each group would implement its own distributed directory service that
would support the group’s members. The directory service software could be easily
integrated into the software that already resides on each group member. The group
members already must support some state per session; pushing the directory service
onto the groups would simply require a bit more state per session. One disadvantage
to this approach is the extra hop required to resolve a query. Another is that it may be
easier for an attacker to disrupt a group due to a limited distribution of directory service
state: A bombardment of traffic with bogus session identifiers would not be stopped at
the proxies—possibly disastrous for a small group.
The amount of traffic overhead to maintain cache entries is minor if there is
adequate memory and if group members include caching information in outbound reply
packets. A proxy should only need to query the directory service if a session moves.
4.3.7 Scalability in session dynamics
As sessions start and end, the directory service and proxy caches must be updated. Up-
dating the directory service first requires routing the insert or removal request through
the overlay network to the directory service node that is responsible for the session ID.
Since the responsible node could be anywhere on the Internet, this could be an expen-
sive operation in terms of network effort. The operation will be even more expensive
if multiple directory service nodes must be contacted due to redundancy requirements.
However, as long as the update packets are infrequent relative to session packets, the
overhead will not be significant.
The challenge is to ensure that the update packets are rare compared to session
packets. This is especially important if an attacker is maliciously starting and stopping
sessions as rapidly as possible. One approach is to rely on IP anycast’s consistent
delivery to a particular proxy and delay inserting the mapping into the directory service
until the remote end has done a sufficient amount of work. This could be after a given
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number of packets or after the remote end has solved a CAPTCHA [9] or computational
puzzle [33].
The mapping also has to be inserted into the local data structure in both the
responsible directory service node and in the anycast proxies that receive the session’s
packets. As discussed above, the number of mappings each proxy must store can be
very large, requiring careful data structure design to accommodate frequent updates.
If session updates are simply too frequent for the proxy hardware to handle, the
workload can be managed by throwing more hardware at the problem: either add more
proxies to busy attachment points or install proxies at new attachment points. With
more proxies, each proxy will process fewer updates.
4.4 Deployability
Deploying Stateful Anycast is just like deploying any other IP anycast group. The
careful planning and negotiating involved in installing a proxy at an new attachment
point is not easy, but cost is amortized across all of the groups and the benefits are
shared.
Operational costs are somewhat higher than running a simple anycast group. Any-
cast proxy hardware needs to be maintained in addition to the group member hardware.
Network connectivity is paid for twice—once by the anycast service provider and once
by the by the group operator. However, these extra costs are also largely shared among
all of the groups.
Almost everything is incrementally deployable. Proxies, groups, and group mem-
bers can all be added one at a time. Even a small deployment can considerably increase
the amount of malicious traffic that can be sunk. Developing the Stateful Anycast soft-
ware and acquiring a large block of IP addresses are the only major deployment tasks
that cannot be done incrementally.
Deploying a Stateful Anycast group is much simpler than deploying an IP anycast
group. All that is required to attach a group member is an ordinary Internet connec-
tion. For optimal performance, the group members should be topologically close to the
proxies, but if load distribution is all that is required, placement is not very important.
Stateful Anycast unfortunately does not support uncoordinated deployment. Due
to the trust required between the group members and the anycast proxies, individuals
cannot independently contribute their own anycast proxies. In addition, group operators
must obtain permission from the Stateful Anycast service provider before they can
deploy the group members.
Although Stateful Anycast does not support uncoordinated deployment, there
is some incentive for deploying a Stateful Anycast service in the form of a business
opportunity. The amortized cost of deploying and running the proxies combined with
the cost of operating the group members can be significantly lower than deploying
a normal IP anycast group. The hard work of developing software to support stateful
sessions, locating good attachment points, negotiating contracts with network operators,
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acquiring a large enough block of IP addresses to prevent filtering by other network
operators, and deploying BGP routers only needs to be done once for all groups. In
addition, the anycast proxies can serve as a platform for deploying complementary
services such as simple multihoming, high performance content distribution, managed
security services, and reliable virtual private networks.
4.5 Protocol Generality
While Stateful Anycast was designed to be as general as possible, it does not support
all protocols. This section discusses some of the limitations and requirements imposed
on protocols by Stateful Anycast.
The primary requirement is that a session identifier must be present in every
packet. Proxies cannot determine the correct session if there is no identifier in a packet.
In addition, Stateful Anycast proxies must be able to extract the session identifier
without knowing any session state. Because a session’s packets can arrive at any proxy,
proxies are not guaranteed to have any historical data about the session. This includes
encryption keys that have been negotiated at the start of the session: proxies will be
unable to identify the session if the identifier is part of the encrypted data. Mechanisms
to distribute session state to proxies would likely suffer from scalability limitations and
DDoS vulnerabilities.
New protocols are not automatically supported by anycast proxies. The proxies
must be programmed to decode the protocols used by the groups they support. If a
group wishes to use a new protocol—or a new version of an old protocol—the Stateful
Anycast operator must update the proxy software to enable the extraction of the session
identifier. While this is not a particularly challenging task, this lack of generality may
discourage the adoption of newer protocols and instead encourage stagnation of protocol
usage.
High-layer stateful sessions that are composed of multiple lower-layer sessions pose
a challenge to Stateful Anycast. Proxies must be able to direct all lower-layer sessions
to the same group member. Support for these kinds of protocols is largely a topic for
future research, but an initial analysis suggests a couple of possible approaches. One
possible approach is to simply limit support to those higher-layer protocols that include
the higher-layer session identifier in every packet. Proxies would then be programmed to
search for a higher-layer session identifier in the payload of a lower-layer protocol. This
will exclude some important protocols, such as the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [62].
FTP requires multiple TCP sessions—one for control and one for each file transfer—yet
does not include a session identifier in the payload of each TCP packet.
An alternate approach for supporting higher-layer protocols whose sessions are
composed of multiple lower-layer sessions is to require group members to insert mappings
for each lower-layer session. The higher-layer protocol must allow a group member to
either discover the lower-layer session identifiers before the lower-layer sessions begin or
choose each lower-layer session identifier. The proxies would be required to treat even
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the start-of-session packets as potentially belonging to an existing stateful session: If
they resolve, send them to the proper group member. If not, send them to any group
member.
For maximal protection against DoS attacks, protocols used by group members
should require a round trip before any state is established in the group member. This
prevents SYN-flood–like attacks and enables group members to easily filter sources that
are trying to rapidly establish sessions (see the “rapid session setup” attack described
in section 4.2 for more details). If cookies are used to require a round trip before
establishing state, the cookie generation and verification algorithms must be the same
for all group members. In addition, proxies should be able to distinguish return cookies
from other types of session data so that they know to forward the return cookie to any
group member rather than issue a directory service query (which would fail).
Even with the above restrictions, most common protocols can be used with State-
ful Anycast without modification. Any stateful protocol that uses a single TCP session
is easily supported (as long as a lower-layer encryption protocol such as IPsec is not
used) by using the source and destination ports and IP addresses as the session identi-
fier. Stateful protocols that use UDP can be supported in a similar way. FTP can be
supported by instructing the proxies to treat TCP SYN packets as possibly belonging
to a stateful session and inserting an additional mapping for the data session when a
PASV or PORT command is issued.
Protocol support would be improved by adding a generic session ID or flow ID field
to the IP headers. Senders would choose a unique value for this field for each session to
help anycast proxies and other middleboxes route packets to the proper destination.
Network architectures that route packets based on an ephemeral, recipient-chosen
identifier would also make Stateful Anycast protocol-independent. i3, with its support
for private triggers, is one example of such an architecture. Host identity protocols such
as HIP [48] could also be used, assuming a mechanism exists for redirecting a session to
a newly generated (and revocable) identity.
4.6 Performance and Efficiency
Stateful Anycast imposes a packet performance penalty from a few different sources:
longer packet traversal paths, processing delay at the anycast proxy, directory service
delays, and encapsulation and metadata overhead. However, Stateful Anycast may
provide better overall performance when compared to traditional single-host commu-
nications. Under certain conditions, Stateful Anycast may even outperform normal IP
anycast. This section discusses how Stateful Anycast might affect packet forwarding
performance.
A packet must stop at an anycast proxy before it can complete its journey to a
group member. This waypoint results in a longer traversal path compared to the direct
path to the group member.2 Longer paths often imply lower path bandwidth due to
2An exception is when routing through a waypoint allows a packet to traverse a short path that is
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a greater number of possible bottlenecks, higher delay and jitter from sitting in more
queues, and greater packet losses from contending for queue space more often. However,
because IP anycast generally selects the topologically closest anycast proxy, the two-
segment forwarding path should not diverge significantly from the direct forwarding
path. Thus, users should see a minimal performance penalty resulting from the longer
paths.
Once a packet reaches an anycast proxy, the packet must be processed. Processing
delay is highly dependent on trade-offs between cost and performance made in the
implementation of an anycast proxy. The impact of processing delay is a possible topic
for future study.
Delays caused by directory service queries could have a significant impact. An
overlay network’s topology is generally independent of the underlying network’s topol-
ogy, sometimes causing long traversal paths between adjacent overlay nodes. Directory
service queries may need to traverse great distances before they reach the resolving di-
rectory service node. Minimizing the average number of overlay hops required to reach
a destination node is important for minimizing the negative performance impact of the
directory service. Each overlay node can be configured to be aware of every other over-
lay node, resulting in single-hop packet delivery. Even with a proxy population of a
few hundred thousand, the state-keeping burden of this configuration should be easily
manageable. However, with frequent proxy membership changes, the traffic required to
maintain this topology state would be very high. Designing the proxies for high reli-
ability should keep topology maintenance overhead small relative to the performance
savings provided by single-hop delivery.
Even a single hop in the directory service overlay network can be very long relative
to the distance between the sender and the group member. Thus, caching directory
service query results is critical for obtaining performance comparable to normal IP
anycast. With adequate cache sizes, caching should result in directory service queries
only when network topology dynamics causes an incoming packet to arrive at a different
proxy.
Encapsulation and metadata overhead provides additional performance penalties.
With small packets—common in real-time applications such as multiplayer games—
the overhead can easily reach 100%. Per-packet overhead for encapsulation inside a
UDP packet is 28 bytes (20 for IP headers, 8 for UDP headers) plus whatever else is
required for digital signatures, proxy identification, group member load, cache update
instructions, etc. This overhead can significantly cut goodput over bandwidth-limited
links. For large packets, the overhead is not as significant. However, if the size of the
original packet is close to the maximum transmission unit of a link, the extra overhead
will cause packet fragmentation. The excess packets will hurt goodput over packet-rate–
limited links.
Even with all of the above performance limitations, Stateful Anycast may provide
a significant application performance improvement compared to deployment at a sin-
otherwise unreachable due to routing policies imposed by network operators.
80
4.6. Performance and Efficiency
gle location. Like Akamai’s content distribution services, Stateful Anycast can direct
packets to nearby idle group members. The short trips to nearby servers reduces packet
delay and the intelligently balanced load eliminates hotspots, resulting in improved ap-
plication responsiveness. Regular IP anycast also reduces packet delay, but is unable
to intelligently balance load among group members. This could give Stateful Anycast
a performance advantage over regular IP anycast when used with processing-intensive
applications.
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Stateful Anycast Software Design
Software for the evaluation of Stateful Anycast is currently being developed. This
chapter highlights some of the key features of the software design.
Section 5.2 discusses the group member software and details how packets are
passed between the group member software and the Internet application running on
the group member. Section 5.3 discusses the anycast proxy software and details how
packets for all groups are captured and forwarded to the group members. Section 5.4
discusses how Stateful Anycast can be evaluated without deploying an anycast group.
However, before diving into the design of the software, a brief diversion will be made
in order to provide background on virtual network interfaces, an operating platform
feature utilized in the Stateful Anycast software.
5.1 Background: Virtual Network Interfaces
The idea behind virtual interfaces is simple: when the operating system routes a packet
to a virtual network interface, the outgoing packet is passed to a separate userspace
program rather than to a hardware device. Packets can also follow the reverse path:
The userspace program associated with the virtual interface generates an incoming
packet and hands it to the virtual interface driver, which injects the packet into the
operating system’s networking subsystem to be routed appropriately.
The userspace program associated with a virtual interface emulates a network
comprised of zero or more hosts. There are many valuable uses for network emulation:
Network simulation programs such as ns-2 [3] emulate a collection of nodes to evaluate
distributed algorithms in a mixed simulated/real environment. Virtual Private Network
(VPN) software—and other tunneling programs such as the Stateful Anycast group
member software—emulate the hosts on the other side of a tunnel by coordinating with
the remote tunnel endpoint. The userspace program receives and processes outgoing
(from the kernel’s perspective) packets and may generate incoming packets.
Figure 5.1 illustrates in greater detail the process of sending and receiving packets
through a virtual interface on a Linux machine.
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Figure 5.1: Virtual network interface packet paths: Outgoing packets are sourced
by some Internet program (a web browser, a web server, etc.) and passed to
the kernel via the Berkeley sockets interface (API) [1]. The kernel then passes
the packet to its networking subsystem, which, due to configured routing rules,
routes the packet to the virtual network interface. The kernel then passes the
packet to the virtual network interface driver, where it is made available to a
userspace program that is emulating a network (such as a VPN client).
5.2 Group Member Software
Hosts must run specialized software in order to participate in a Stateful Anycast group.
This software is responsible for numerous tasks, such as relaying packets, authenticating
with the rest of the group and with the proxies, inserting and removing directory service
mappings, and detecting when a session has become malicious. The design of the first
version of the group member software, intended to be a proof-of-concept, contains only
the features necessary to demonstrate the effectiveness of Stateful Anycast.
The group member software’s most basic function is to relay packets between the
anycast proxies and the server software running on the group member node. How this
function is implemented determines the high-level software architecture. Encapsulating
and decapsulating packets is architecturally straightforward, as is sending packets to
and receiving packets from the anycast proxies. The greater design challenge lies in how
packets are passed to and from the server software.
There is a range of approaches to handling the server–group member connection.
One extreme is tight integration, where the group member software is also the server
software. With this approach, passing an incoming packet to the server software becomes
passing the payload memory location to a function. This approach can yield high
performance, resulting in a better end-user experience. More importantly, it simplifies
the process of combining security information from both the group member and server
roles of the software.
The other extreme is complete separation: the group member software abstracts
away the anycast proxy communication and provides an ordinary network service to
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the server software. All communication between the group member software and the
server software would pass through the operating system’s kernel as normal IP packets.
This strong modularity improves flexibility and provides backwards compatibility with
existing server software. However, the abstraction prevents the group member and
server software from sharing information that would be valuable in making security
decisions.
The group member software design takes the middle ground: Complete separation
except for a process to monitor the health of the protected server software. Monitor-
ing processes for new server applications can be implemented as plug-ins to the group
member software. These plug-ins should evaluate server and session health by watching
server log output, for example. An illustration of the high-level architecture is provided
in figure 5.2.
This chosen approach is well-suited for evaluating Stateful Anycast’s effectiveness,
as software development time is kept at a minimum. Existing server software can be
reused to provide a realistic application to run on top of Stateful Anycast, and a manual
or scripted monitoring process should suffice for testing and evaluation purposes.
5.3 Anycast Proxy Software
The anycast proxy software’s most basic function is to relay packets between the remote
users and the group members. Encapsulating/decapsulating packets and communicating
with the group members is architecturally straightforward; the design challenge lies in
capturing incoming packets from remote users as well as sending outgoing packets to
the remote users.
A first-pass approach to capturing incoming packets is to configure the network
interface with each and every anycast IP address; the anycast proxy software would then
bind to every anycast IP address upon initialization. This approach is somewhat messy
(the IP addresses must be assigned to the interface before the anycast proxy software
is started) and may not scale to a large number of anycast addresses. In addition, care
must be taken to ensure that other applications do not bind to the anycast IP addresses,
otherwise they might intercept the packets that should be sent to the group members.
Using one of two alternate approaches—routing to a virtual interface or using a
packet capture library—are preferred, as they require less system configuration and do
a better job at isolating packets from the rest of the system. These two approaches
are discussed in more detail below. Each approach has its advantages and disadvan-
tages, and neither is clearly superior. The packet capture library approach has been
implemented; the virtual interface approach may be implemented at a later time.
5.3.1 Remote Client to Anycast Proxy: Virtual Interface Approach
The first approach, illustrated in figure 5.3, is to route all incoming anycast packets to
a virtual interface. The anycast proxy software is attached to the “other side” of the
virtual interface so that it can read and process the incoming anycast packets.
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Figure 5.2: Group member software architecture. Compare with figure 5.1.
Bold arrows represent paths taken by encapsulating packets, while the thin
arrows represent paths taken by unwrapped packets. An incoming encapsulating
packet first arrives at the hardware network interface, where it is picked up
by the interface driver and passed to the kernel’s networking subsystem. The
kernel networking subsystem examines the destination IP address (which is the
host’s unicast IP address) and UDP port number of the encapsulating packet
and determines that it should be routed to the group member management
software via a socket previously established by the management software. After
processing any metadata, the management software extracts the encapsulated
packet and passes it to the virtual interface driver. The virtual interface driver
places the packet back in the kernel’s networking subsystem, making it appear as
if the encapsulated packet just arrived at a second hardware network interface.
The networking subsystem examines the destination IP address (which is now
the anycast group IP address) and TCP or UDP port number of the encapsulated
packet and determines that it should be routed to the server software via a socket
previously established by the server software. The server receives and processes
the packet as normal. Reply packets follow the reverse path. Meanwhile, a
plug-in monitors the health of the server and stands ready to revoke malicious
sessions.
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Figure 5.3: Anycast proxy incoming packet path when using the virtual interface
approach. Incoming anycast packets arrive at the hardware interface and are
passed to the kernel’s networking subsystem. Due to preconfigured routing rules,
the kernel forwards the packets via the virtual interface, where they are picked
up by the anycast proxy software. Once the packets are encapsulated, they are
sent out using the standard Berkeley sockets API.
For this approach to work, the upstream router and anycast proxy require config-
uration, but nothing as involved as assigning each anycast IP address to an interface.
First, the upstream router must be configured to forward all traffic destined to an any-
cast group IP address to the unicast address of the anycast proxy. Second, the anycast
proxy must have IP forwarding enabled in the kernel. Third, the anycast proxy must
have a route in its routing table that says to send all traffic destined to an anycast IP
address out the virtual interface.
The detailed processing steps for an incoming packet are as follows:
1. When an incoming anycast packet arrives at the upstream router, the router sends
an ARP query to determine the lower-layer MAC (hardware) address associated
with the anycast proxy’s unicast IP address.
2. The anycast proxy’s operating system receives the ARP request, recognizes that
the query IP address matches the IP address assigned to its hardware interface,
and responds by sending back an ARP reply containing the MAC address of its
hardware interface.
3. The upstream router caches the ARP reply and forwards the incoming anycast
packet to the anycast proxy by addressing the link-layer packet to the proxy’s
MAC address.
4. The anycast proxy’s operating system receives the packet and recognizes that it
is not destined for local delivery (the destination IP address does not match any
of the IP addresses assigned to its interfaces). Because it is not destined for local
delivery, the operating system decides to forward the packet.
5. The operating system identifies the best-matching route entry in its routing table
and sends the packet out the interface identified in the routing table entry. If the
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routing table is configured properly, the outgoing interface should be the virtual
interface that leads to the anycast proxy software.
6. The anycast proxy software receives the anycast packet from the virtual interface
device driver, processes it appropriately, and forwards it to the proper group
member.
When compared with the packet capture library approach, the main advantage
is that packets follow the operating system’s normal processing path. This enables
the use of system-provided packet filtering, simplifies troubleshooting (as normal net-
work troubleshooting tools such as packet sniffers can be easily employed), and possibly
provides superior performance. The main disadvantage is that programmatically con-
figuring the virtual interface and manipulating the routing table is difficult to do in a
platform-independent way.
Outgoing packets can be sent by writing their contents to the virtual interface
driver.
5.3.2 Remote Client to Anycast Proxy: Packet Capture Library Ap-
proach
The second approach, illustrated in figure 5.4, is to use a portable packet capture library
(such as libpcap [2]) to grab a copy of all packets destined to an anycast group address
that arrive at the physical interface. Because the anycast proxy software receives a copy
of each incoming packet, it is important that the original packets be silently dropped.
If the originals are routed back out the system or if ICMP [59] messages are generated
in response to incoming anycast packets, communication can be disrupted.
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Figure 5.4: Anycast proxy incoming packet path when using the packet capture
library approach. Incoming anycast packets arrive at the hardware interface
and are passed to the kernel’s networking subsystem. A copy of the packets are
given to the packet capture library while the originals are dropped.
Getting the operating system to drop the original copy of the anycast packet can
be tricky. The simplest way to implement the packet capture approach is to configure
the upstream router to forward all anycast packets to the unicast address of the anycast
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proxy (just as in the virtual interface approach), turn off forwarding, and use libpcap in
non-promiscuous mode to grab a copy of all anycast packets. With this configuration,
the host recognizes that the anycast packets are not destined to the local host, so they
are simply discarded. However, if forwarding is turned on, the kernel will attempt to
forward the packet. If there is no known route to the destination (possibly due to a
reject route added to the routing table), the host will bounce back an ICMP destination
unreachable message. If there is a route to the destination but the next hop is back out
the interface the packet came in on (which is likely due to a default route match), the
host will send an ICMP redirect message to the upstream router. If there is a route out
a different interface, the operating system will simply pass the packet on to someone
else. All of these will likely disrupt communication.
Alternate packet capture method to improve robustness
To improve robustness in the face of an accidental enabling of packet forwarding, an al-
ternative packet capture tactic can be used. This alternate method is more complicated
to implement, but results in the kernel dropping the original copy of each incoming
anycast packet with certainty.
For this alternate method, the upstream router is configured to believe that all of
the anycast IP addresses can be directly reached via the same interface as the anycast
proxy (as opposed to being configured to send the packet via the anycast proxy’s unicast
address). The packet capture library in the anycast proxy is configured to place the
interface in promiscuous mode (all packets received on the interface—not just those
with a destination MAC address that matches—are passed to the kernel). Finally, the
anycast proxy software randomly generates a MAC address to be used in all outgoing
packets (discussed below).
When an anycast packet arrives at the upstream router, the processing steps are
as follows:
1. The router issues an ARP query on the downstream interface to determine the
MAC address of the hardware interface configured for the destination anycast IP
address.
2. The anycast proxy’s operating system receives the ARP query, but ignores it since
none of the interfaces are configured to use any of the anycast IP addresses.
3. libpcap grabs a copy of the ARP query and passes it to the anycast proxy software.
4. The anycast proxy software notices that the query is for an anycast address and
forms an ARP reply packet containing the randomly-generated MAC address.
The reply ARP packet is passed to libpcap, which injects the raw frame into the
hardware interface’s outgoing queue.
5. The upstream router receives the ARP reply containing the randomly-generated
MAC address and forwards the incoming anycast packet to that MAC address.
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6. The anycast proxy’s operating system receives the anycast packet, even though the
destination MAC address does not match the hardware interface’s MAC address.
This is because the interface was placed in promiscuous mode by libpcap. The
operating system simply ignores the anycast packet because the destination MAC
address does not match
7. libpcap grabs a copy of the anycast packet and sends it to the anycast proxy
software, where it is processed as usual.
The key to this method is to ensure that the MAC address used by the upstream
router to forward the anycast packet does not match the MAC address of the anycast
proxy’s hardware interface. With the differing MAC addresses, the incoming anycast
packets will certainly be dropped by the operating system, yet libpcap will still obtain
a copy.
The packet capture library approach is certainly more complicated to implement,
but it is simpler for the system administrator. Routing tables do not need to be modified,
nor do virtual interfaces need configuration—everything is handled by the anycast proxy
software. In addition, libpcap can be used on many platforms. Unfortunately, libpcap’s
design trades packet delay for high throughput and low overhead, making it less suitable
for Internet applications that are sensitive to delays or jitter.
Outgoing packets can be sent by injecting raw frames into the hardware interface’s
outgoing queue using libpcap.
5.4 Testing Stateful Anycast
There are a couple of straightforward ways to test the Stateful Anycast software and
design without going to the trouble and expense of deploying an actual anycast group.
One method is to use the network emulation capabilities in a network simulator such as
ns-2 [3]. Several virtual machines plus the network emulator could be bridged together,
with the network emulator moderating communication between the hosts on a scripted
or programmatic basis.
The other approach is to deploy nodes on a network research platform such as
PlanetLab [56]. Because these nodes are not anycasted, anycast will have to be emu-
lated using tunneling. The test clients will run a proxy selector application that, for
every packet, selects the unicast IP address of an anycast proxy from a preconfigured
list, encapsulates the packet, and forwards it to the proxy. The proxy runs software
to unwrap the encapsulated packet and pass it to the anycast proxy software. An il-
lustration of the process is presented in figure 5.5. Return packets take the reverse
path.
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Figure 5.5: Testing Stateful Anycast using a virtualized anycast implemented
with tunneling. Applications running on the test client bind to a virtual interface
that is connected to an anycast proxy selector program. When the client sends
a packet, the proxy selector chooses an anycast proxy, encapsulates the packet,
then sends the packet out the hardware interface. When the encapsulated packet
arrives at the anycast proxy, extra software there decapsulates the packet and
passes it to the anycast proxy software.
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Conclusion
Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks have been plaguing the Internet for some time,
with no end in sight. Several mitigation techniques have been proposed, but none have
emerged as a clear leader. No existing Internet DDoS mitigation mechanism has been
shown to be effective, practical, and general. Stateful Anycast is an attempt at filling
the void.
The toughest type of DDoS attack to defend against is one where the attacker
has a well-distributed botnet capable of sourcing enough traffic to overwhelm the links
leading to a selected node. With this kind of attacker, defenses at the victim are useless
because legitimate traffic is suppressed before it even reaches the victim. An effective
solution must be “in” the network, where it can drop traffic before damage is done.
Anycast has proven to be effective at handling these flooding attacks, as witnessed
by failed attempts at the critical DNS infrastructure [32]. Unfortunately, its effectiveness
is limited to stateless communications. Anycast makes no guarantees about which group
member will receive a packet that is addressed to an anycast group. Senders are unable
to hold a reliable conversation if the anycast group member is obligated to remember
state between packets.
To hold a stateful conversation, the sender must have some way of instructing the
network to deliver data to the stateholder—a so-called handle on the stateholder. The
simplest example is an address given by the sender to the network. The network uses
the address to find and route packets to the stateholder. With stateless protocols, the
sender does not need a handle on a specific node—the sender can describe a particular
desired service and the network can arbitrarily choose the recipient from the set of nodes
that provide the service.
If stateholders are unable to invalidate handles, attackers have a permanent ability
to direct packets toward a particular stateholder. If the handles are not tied to a specific
sender, the handle can be shared with fellow attackers to launch a distributed attack
against the stateholder. Therefore, to protect stateful services from DDoS attacks,
handles on stateholders must either be revocable or unusable by other nodes.
Making handles unusable by other nodes removes support for host mobility. For
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the handle to be non-portable, its validity must be tied to something outside the sender’s
control, namely the topology between the sender and the stateholder. Unfortunately,
this means that a legitimate node can have its handle invalidated by moving to a different
region of the network.
Rather than making handles unusable by other nodes, Stateful Anycast is designed
to give stateholders the power to revoke handles. By revoking a malicious handle, an
attacker is prevented from focusing all of its resources onto a single stateholder (assuming
there is more than one member of the Stateful Anycast group). The best the attacker
can do is repeatedly attempt to establish new sessions or mimic a flash crowd, both
of which will cause Stateful Anycast to distribute the malicious load among the group
members. As long as there are enough group members with enough bandwidth to
collectively absorb the malicious load without disruption, the attacker will fail.
Revocation is enforced by a distributed collection of anycasted middleboxes called
anycast proxies. These proxies are the gateways to the stateholders, and have the
primary responsibility of matching an incoming packet with the proper stateholder.
Matching a packet to the proper stateholder involves querying a distributed database
that is updated by the stateholders as sessions are established, concluded, or declared
malicious. Database query results are cached to improve performance and limit DoS
vulnerability.
Anycasting the proxies serves two purposes. First, attackers are prevented from
singling out and disabling any one of the proxies. Second, because the Internet’s routing
protocols will generally select the anycast group member that is closest to the sender,
the proxies are well-positioned to drop malicious traffic early.
The approach taken by Stateful Anycast provides several features:
 Generality: Stateful Anycast can support a wide range of stateful protocols.
As long as a proxy is able to extract the session identifier from a packet, it can
route the packet to the proper stateholder or drop it if the stateholder desires.
In addition, the group members—not the anycast proxies—are responsible for
detecting attacks. This allows them to change behavior without causing false
alarms.
 Practicality: Stateful Anycast can be incrementally deployed, and benefits are
realized even with small deployments. Stateful Anycast scales gracefully, and can
provide benefits beyond DDoS protection (a Stateful Anycast group can provide
Akakmai-like performance improvements). There is no need for multiple parties to
coordinate deployment or even agree upon protocols—any organization can unilat-
erally decide to become a Stateful Anycast service provider. The only third-party
dependency is on Internet Service Providers to supply straightforward Internet
access for the anycast proxies.
 Effectiveness: Stateful Anycast lets the destination stateholder—the node with
the most information regarding the intent of a sender—decide which packets to
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drop, yet packets are dropped close to the source before significant damage is
done.
One drawback of Stateful Anycast’s design is that an attack must necessarily reach
its victim before it can be detected and shut down. Fortunately, Stateful Anycast can
be easily combined with other defense techniques to provide a comprehensive network
security system. Some mechanisms, such as packet filters, could be deployed on the
anycast proxies to take advantage of their strategic location. A powerful defensive
tactic may be to rely on other in-network defensive techniques to take care of the most
obvious attacks and let the group members use their intimate knowledge of “proper”
behavior to clean up the rest.
6.1 Future Work
The next step is the completion of an initial version of the anycast proxy and group
member software. Once a basic version is complete, evaluation can begin on Stateful
Anycast’s efficiency and effectiveness under realistic scenarios. Reliance on the directory
service is perhaps the most risky aspect of Stateful Anycast’s design, so a thorough
evaluation of its performance under stress is perhaps the most important future result.
Other aspects to evaluate include path stretch, tolerance to rapid topology changes,
revocation response time, packet forwarding rates on commodity hardware, directory
service latency, and so on.
Once Stateful Anycast has demonstrated adequate performance in a real-world
scenario, a further step would be the maturation of the software into a deployable
product. This would include the development of scalable algorithms for distributing new
sessions among group members in a way that maximizes end-user performance, tuning
the directory service routing algorithms to achieve maximal uptime in an adversarial
environment, increasing the cache lookup and packet forwarding rates in the anycast
proxies, and implementing DDoS attack detection plug-ins to monitor server health.
Taking a long-term perspective, a valuable exercise would be to design a hypotheti-
cal network architecture that includes packet flows as a network primitive. With routing
based on packet flows, Stateful Anycast could forward or drop traffic in a protocol-
agnostic manner.
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